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I.INTRODUCTION
"At least two fora will be available in any major legal ac-
tion with transnational elements."l This statement by an
international scholar reflects the implications and sig-
nificance of the phenomenon of international concurrent
jurisdiction.2 In the same dispute, the courts of more than
one country may (and do) assume jurisdiction, suits may be
brought in different countries, and in more than one
country. Examples of parallel proceedings abound, and many
are well known because of their impact on important legal
issues and developments.3 The Laker controversy, which went
through the newspapers and law reviews extensively, may be
mentioned here as the example of recent times.4 Leading to
quite serious tensions between the United States and Eng-
land, it clearly, though in an unfortunate way, showed the
danger of conflicts inherent in a setting of concurrent
jurisdiction. The focus of this thesis is on how legal sys-
tems deal with the setting of multiple assumptions of com-
petence or jurisdiction over one dispute.
Let us have a brief look at the scenario of litigation
which may occur in a setting of concurrent jurisdiction.
First, the plaintiff has the choice between more than one
forum. Where should he commence a suit? At this point, the
1
2notions of "forum shopping" enter the stage.5 The plaintiff
will choose a forum with favorable substantive6 and procedu-
ral law.7 He will look for low costs of proceedings, and
take into account the enforcement possibilities (does the
defendant have sufficient assets in the forum state, or will
the judgment be enforceable in the state where the assets
are 10cated?).8 In the eyes of a plaintiff, the United
States are, using the words of the Supreme Court, "extremely
attractive."g Lord Denning of the English Court of Appeal
expressed the same notion in a somewhat sarcastic way: "As a
moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States. If he can only get his case into their
courts, he stands to win a fortune."lO The latter, under-
standably, may not please the defendant. Since "[e]ach of
the litigants prefers to fight on favorable territory"ll,
the defendant might decide on instituting a countersuit in a
forum he considers as favorable, and where he may try to
preempt the outcome of the dispute by initiating a declara-
tory judgment proceeding. Even if this might not avoid or
reduce liability, it is likely to delay "the moment of
truth" and payroent.12 The second court might not accept the
suit because proceedings are pending in the same matter in
another jurisdiction. The plaintiff may try to enjoin the
defendant from instituting foreign proceedings. The defen-
dant may want to do the same. will courts issue injunctions
in support of the parties' wishes? Finally, if one proceed-
ing is completed and a judgment rendered, will the other
3jurisdiction recognize the foreign judgment and reject new
suits or stop a pending suit in the same matter? These are
only some of the questions interesting a lawyer in transna-
tional litigation, but they may suffice for the purpose of
introducing into the scenario of transnational litigation.
Concerns which result from concurrent jurisdiction in-
clude the potential interference of one jurisdiction with
another, and the possibility that conflicting judgments may
evolve. This thesis will examine how legal systems deal with
the phenomenon of multiple assumptions of jurisdiction over
the same dispute. We will first look at public international
law rules on jurisdiction, regulating (or not regulating)
conflicting states interests, which will give only modest
guidance.13 In view of those rules, the subsequent chapters
will deal with various institutions of national laws
relating to the possibility of parallel proceedings in the
courts of more than one country, and thus the possibility of
the emergence of conflicting orders or judgments. Of course,
this thesis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive
coverage of all legal systems and their relevant
institutions, but can only highlight some selected and
seemingly important parts of the whole. This limitation
applies to both the selection of topics and the selection of
national laws to be looked at. The emphasis will be laid on
United States law, supplemented by some European features.
As law in general, using the words of the legal philos-
opher Ronald Dworkin, is "sword, shield, and menace,,,14 the
4
various institutions of national laws will be classified
into aggressive (for example injunctions restraining foreign
proceedings), defensive (doctrines of forum non conveniens,
lis pendens, and recognition of foreign judgments), and
precautionary institutions (choice of forum and arbitration
clauses). This classification should help systematize a
confusing variety of institutions.
It will appear that the use of aggressive institutions
is not desirable as concerns proper relations between
nations. Defensive institutions are more favorable in this
regard, because they try to avoid conflicts and the
emergence of conflicting judgments by restraining domestic
proceedings rather than foreign proceedings. Wide recogni-
tion of precautionary institutions which allocate the reso-
lution of a dispute to one exclusive forum would avoid con-
flicts and conflicting judgments to a great extent. On the
whole, the various institutions of national laws can be em-
ployed in a way that shows that concurrent jurisdiction does
not necessarily lead to conflicts.
II. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JURISDICTION
States accept that there are rules of international law and
that those rules are binding on them. Thus, it is recognized
that international law ~ impose rules on the exercise of
jurisdiction by states.15 The question therefore is, to what
extent does international law limit the exercise of juris-
diction.
As opposed to an internal United States situation we
will find relative freedom from rules, since "no interna-
tional constitution limits the jurisdiction of courts.,,16
Yet, this statement on the absence of rules of international
law should not be taken literally, as international law does
impose general limitations on the right of states to assert
jurisdiction. This results from a fundamental principle of
international law, the principle of sovereign equality. Ju-
risdiction is just an aspect or emanation of sovereignty.17
F.A. Mann accurately described the relationship between sov-
ereignty and the exercise of jurisdiction as follows:
"Since every State enjoys the same degree of sovereign-
ty, jurisdiction implies respect for the corresponding
rights of other States ...• jurisdiction involves both
the right to exercise it within the limits of the
State's sovereignty and the duty to recognize the same
right of other states.,,18
5
6The subsequent considerations will first cover bases of ju-
risdiction and then deal with limitations on the exercise of
jurisdiction "backed" by a valid basis.
A. Bases of Jurisdiction
1. The Lotus Case
Historically, the problem of jurisdiction arose in the field
of criminal law.19 The only decision of an authoritative
international tribunal directly on the question of jurisdic-
tion is the decision of the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Lotus case.20 The court held that Turkey had
not violated international law in assuming criminal juris-
diction over a French officer in command of a French ship,
which collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas, killing
several Turkish citizens. The decision was mainly based on
the ground that the French ship's act could be considered to
have had its effect on the Turkish ship, which is to be seen
as an extension of Turkish territory, and that therefore the
assumption of jurisdiction was supported by traditional
principles.21 Although the court was divided, both "halves"
recognized that jurisdiction "could only be claimed upon one
of the recognized bases.,,22 The "burden of proof", however,
was cast on the challenger of jurisdiction. The six dissent-
ing judges disagreed with this proposition.23 Some often
cited obiter dicta of the majority seem to proclaim a prin-
ciple of presumptive freedom of state action:
7" a State ... may not exercise its power in any form
in the territory of another State. In this sense juris-
diction is certainly territorial.
It does not, however, follow that international law
prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its
own territory, in respect of any case which relates to
acts which have taken place abroad ... Far from laying
down a general prohibition to the effect that States
may not extend the application of their laws and the
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and
acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this
respect a wide measure of discretion which is only li-
mited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards
other cases, every state remains free to adopt the
principles which it regards as best and most
suitable. ,,24
But these sentences are not as far-reaching as is sometimes
assumed,25 because the court goes on and refers to limits
under international law:
"In these circumstances all that can be required of a
State is that it should not overstep the limits which
international law places upon its jurisdiction.,,26
Far from being clear, the court at least acknowledged that
there are certain limitations. What these limits are, re-
mained rather uncertain. At least the court tried to link,
and thereby "justify,,,27 Turkey's exercise of jurisdiction
to one of the "recognized bases" by referring to the effects
on Turkish "territory.,,28 This effort to justify the asser-
tion of jurisdiiction would not have been necessary had the
court taken the presumption of freedom literally.
One point of major importance of the case may be seen
in its recognition of concurrent jurisdiction:
"The conclusion at which the court has therefore ar-
rived is that there is no rule of international law in
regard to collision cases to the effect that criminal
proceedings are exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the State whose flag is flown .... Neither the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of either State, nor the
8limitations of the jurisdiction of each to the occuren-
ces which took place on the respective ships would ap-
pear calculated to satisfy the requirements of justice
and effectively to protect the interests of the two
states. It is only natural that each should be able to
exercise jurisdiction and to do so in respect to the
incident as a whole. It is therefore a case of concur-
rent jurisdiction.,,29
should be noted for later, that the court referred to the
of the "interests of the two states".
Traditional Bases
Traditional principles of international law allow the exer-
cise of jurisdiction on several bases, which are30 ter-
ritoriality, nationality, protective principle and univer-
sality.31
a. territorial principle
This is the oldest and most established base of jurisdiction
under customary international law.32 It was already embraced
by the old Dutch jurists whose views were cited and adopted
by Story.33 The concept that a state has the right to regu-
late conduct or activity within its physical boundaries may
indeed be regarded as "axiomatic".34 One emanation of the
territorial principle is the so-called "objective ter-
ritorial principle" or the "effects doctrine", which is de-
scribed by the new Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States as covering "conduct outside its ter-
ritory which has or is intended to have substantial effects
within its territory.,,35 This principle, which plays an im-
portant part in United States anti-trust jurisdiction36,
9and was already indicated in the Lotus case37, has in recent
years been strengthened38 by its adoption by the EEC39 and
Germany.40 Its extent is, however, controversial.41
b. nationality principle
There is wide agreement that, in principle, a state has the
right to regulate activity by its nationals within or out-
side its territory.42
c. protective principle
A state is entitled to protect its security by exercising
jurisdiction over certain conduct (also outside its ter-
ritory and by persons not its nationals) "which is directed
against the security of the state or a limited class of
state interests.,,43
d. universality principle
certain crimes are so universally condemned that all states
have jurisdiction to try and punish these offenses. The
prime example is piracy, but beyond that the coverage of
this base is less clear.44
3. Genuine Link Theories Regarding Bases of Jurisdiction
The traditional bases, which were developed in the field of
criminal jurisdiction, are not necessarily appropriate as
regards areas other than criminal law. For example, as con-
cerns jurisdiction in commercial law, multinational corpora-
tions may easily shift their "nationality" by transferring
their center of business, and thus avoid undesirable
10
jurisdiction.45 Writers sought for a general principle un-
derlying the traditional bases.
F.A. Mann was the "first to free himself entirely from
the bonds of international criminal law,,46 and apply a dif-
ferent approach. Realizing the history and inter-relation
between the conflict of laws and public international law as
regards the reach of jurisdiction or legislation47, he pro-
posed a "search for the State or States whose contact with
the facts is such as to make the allocation of legislative
competence just and reasonable.,,48 According to this view, a
state has legislative jurisdiction if there is a substantial
connection or a genuine link to justify its exercise.49
Other authors adopted similar concepts asking for a
meaningful contact,50 or a subsantial and genuine or bona
fide connection.51
All these concepts may be supported by an analogy to
the views of the International Court of Justice in the Not-
tebohm case, which concerned the competence of states to
confer nationality on individuals. The Court made a state's
exercise of diplomatic protection over its nationals subject
to the existence of a genuine link.52 However, due to the
narrow subject before the court53, the court's holding does
not mean that the International Court adopted a genuine link
theory as to jurisdiction in general.54
Besides the problem whether the theory is already part
of international law, there is also the problem what con-
stitutes a genuine link. Different areas of law may also
1
!
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require different "connecting factors".55 Thus, criminal law
,
may well keep the traditional bases, whereas antitrust regu-
lation may possibly be based on a state's "enlightened self-
interest. ,,56
B. Application of Jurisdictional Theories of International
Law to Proceedings of Courts
Courts are state organs, and a state exercises jurisdiction
through courts as well as through legislatures or ad-
ministrative agencies. consequently, the exercise of juris-
diction through courts should also be subject to the limita-
tions of international law.
1. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
So far we have mainly spoken of legislative jurisdiction or,
in the terminology of the Restatement, of jurisdiction to
prescribe.57 We are, however, mainly interested with acts of
courts, with the assumption of jurisdiction by courts. The
Restatement includes a separate section entitled "jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate,,58, which tries to state specific rules
for adjudication, we might say special connecting factors.
But, on principle, this is "not a separate type of jurisdic-
tion, but merely an emanation of the international jurisdic-
tion to legislate.,,59 Whether a court may rightly assume
jurisdiction under international law is not separable into
issues such as personal or subject matter jurisdiction in
12
united States law. Both aspects have to be seen together,
since we are concerned with the assumption of jurisdiction
by courts over all, not only with personal or "curial" ju-
risdiction.60 For an "order" to be internationally valid
"not only its making, but also its content must be author-
ized by substantial rules of legislative jurisdiction.,,61
The introduction of a law and the entry of a judgment do
both regulate human behavior62, wherefore it is correct to
say that
"a state's right to regulate is exercised by legisla-
tive jurisdiction which includes adjudication .... both
aspects of jurisdiction are co-extensive.,,63
Thus, the rules we have discussed so far apply to the as-
sumption of jurisdiction by courts as well.64
2. Civil, Criminal and Regulatory Jurisdiction
Some writers argue that, contrary to the rule in the area of
criminal and regulatory jurisdiction, "there are no rules of
international law limiting the legislative jurisdiction of
States in questions of what might loosely be described as
private law.,,65 They try to base their proposition on the
fact that there are no recorded diplomatic objections by
states to the assumption of civil jurisdiction on bases
showing little real connection with the forum.66 The op-
posite extreme position states that "there is no room for
distinguishing between criminal, public and private laws.,,67
Neither of these extremes appear to be convincing. Since the
main consideration behind jurisdiction is sovereignty,68 the
13
decisive factor should be whether the exercise of jurisdic-
tion is a manifestation of state policy. This approach is
espoused by Bowett when he says that
"where the civil jurisdiction of the state is an in-
strument of state policy, used as a means of exercising
control over activities or resources in the interests
of the state, then in principle such jurisdiction ought
to be subject to the same governing rules of interna-
tional law.,,69
A prime example of civil jurisdiction as an instrument of
state policy is the civil action under United States anti-
trust law. Areas of civil jurisdiction which concern only
the enforcement of private rights (what we may call "purely
civil jurisdiction") would "remain very much within the dis-
cretion of the state.,,70 But even then one would look for
"any link.,,71 The following will show some illustrations.
c. Examples of "Exorbitant" Bases of Jurisdiction
This section will give some examples showing on which broad
grounds states assert jurisdiction in civil matters.
1. United States
The United States approach is on its face quite analogous to
the above discussed "links approach." Since International
Shoe jurisdiction has to be based on certain "minimum con-
tacts" between the defendant and the forum state.72 The
problem is the application of the principle. In some deci-
sions the United States "long arm" reached rather far.73 One
14
has to keep in mind that the minimum contacts doctrine is a
constitutional doctrine,74 not a doctrine for international
law purposes.75 Unfortunately, the courts so far applied the
same standards whether they dealt with an internal United
States interstate setting or an international setting.76 A
turning point might have come with the Asahi case, which
left open whether the stream of commerce theory is ap-
plicable to foreign defendants, or whether closer connec-
tions are required in international cases.77 The sometimes
"concerningly grasping,,78 assumption of jurisdiction by Uni-
tedStates courts gave rise to some criticism.79
2. England
England, in the tradition of the Common Law, still adheres
to the principle of presence unlimited by a minimum contacts
doctrine as is the case in the United states.80 Thus, anyone
can validly be served when he is present in the country,
even if he or she is only changing planes at London Air-
port.81 Another critizised practice is the assumption of
jurisdiction over disputes involving a contract governed by
English law.82
3. France
Under Art. 14 Code Civil, jurisdiction over disputes con-
cerning obligations concluded by the defendant with a French
person depends alone on the fact that the plaintiff is a
French national, even if the defendant is a non-resident
15
foreigner.83 Art. 15 Code Civil, in a sort of reverse man-
ner, confers jurisdiction over French defendants, even if
they are not resident or domiciled in France, in matters of
obligations contracted by them in a foreign country.84
French courts have even extended the reach of these sections
by interpreting the referred to "obligations" to include
non-contractual situations like torts.85 Especially Art. 14
has understandably given rise to many criticisms, even with-
in France.86
4. Federal Republic of Germany
§ 23 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure confers personal
jurisdiction over anyone having property in Germany. The
action does not have to be related to the property and is
not limited to the value of the property.8? This "unfortu-
nate" basis has lead to sharp criticism by scholars from
within and outside Germany.88
5. The Impact of the European Convention
No official protests by states objecting to those "exorbi-
tant" bases have been recorded. In any case, these bases are
probably not violative of internatioal law in the area of
"purely civil" jurisdiction where "any link" presumably suf-
fices.89 It is, however, interesting to note, that the Euro-
pean Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters90 abolishes the exor-
bitant bases. Art. 3 (2) of the Convention gives a catalogue
16
of provisions and grounds on which jurisdiction over domi-
ciliaries of another contracting party may not be based. The
catalogue includes Art. 14, 15 Code Civil, § 23 ZPO, and the
transitory presence rule of English law. This exclusion of
exorbitant bases by the Convention, together with the con-
cerned criticisms of writers, suggests that these bases
should be looked at with uneasiness. However, the very fact
that the Convention expressly excluded those bases would
appear to suggest that they are not unlawful under general
international law.
D. Multiple Jurisdiction
International law recognizes the possibility of concurrent
or multiple jurisdiction over the same conduct. This was
expressly acknowledged in the Lotus case.91 And it implicit-
ly follows from the principles on bases of jurisdiction,
which allow some overlap because they are discrete and in-
dependent bases of jurisdiction.92 For instance, the same
activity may provide a basis for exercise of jurisdiction
both by the territorial state and by the state of the
nationality of the actor.93 This possibility of overlap is
even more true for the area of "purely civil" jurisdiction,
where the bases are very broad and far-reaching.94 The Euro-
pean convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and commercial Matters95 also recognizes con-
current jurisdiction. This follows from the variety of
17
adopted bases under Art. 5 and 6 of the Convention, which
bases concur with the general base of domicile under Art. 2
of the convention.96 After all, it is no wonder that some
i writers state that "concurrent jurisdiction is the rule
rather than the exception.,,97
Whether and how international law limits the exercise
of concurrent jurisdiction will be dealt with in the sub-
sequent chapter.
E. Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction
1. Comment on the System of APproach
Before we try to establish criteria by what to assess the
propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction by one state in
view of concurrent jurisdiction of another state, some sys-
tematic remarks seem appropriate. We, quite naturally it ap-
pears, espouse an approach distinguishing between bases of
jurisdiction and limits on the exercise of concurrent ju-
risdiction. Firstly, one looks for a basis justifying the
assumption of jurisdiction in the first place, and secondly,
one asks whether the exercise of jurisdiction in a given
situation would be appropriate or reasonable and does not
"[encroach] on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to,
or more appropriately exercisable by another State.,,98 Not
all authors agree with such a two-step approach, because
they see no use in constructing two "prohibitory zones"
(namely bases and exercise of jurisdiction justified by a
18
base), where all relevant aspects can be covered by one
category of rules on the exercise of jurisdiction only (one-
step approach).99 This objection seems to go along with the
proponents of the "abuse of rights" theory, who assume that
international law only prohibits the abuse of the generally
existing right of jurisdiction.100 Some genuine link theo-
ries seem to coincide with abuse of rights theories in this
respect and also try to encompass all aspects in one wide
concept of "reasonableness" of the link.101
Here we see, that the matter is one of terminology ra-
ther than substance. For one can easily separate the concept
of reasonableness from the finding of links or bases, as was
done in the Restatement (Revised).102 Clarity makes our two-
step approach preferable. There is also the substantive rea-
son that one should not presuppose a right of jurisdiction
(what one-step approaches necessarily do) in all cases, as
we have seen in our discussion of the Lotus case.103
2. Rules on the Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction
a. general considerations - toward a "balancing of
interests"
The question is whether jurisdiction should be exercised by
state A rather than state B where both states can invoke one
or another of the bases to support their claim.104 There is
a case to be made for allowing either state to assume juris-
diction in certain cases. Multinational enterprises do not
consider it as extraordinary that their activities are
19
subjected to the jurisdiction of several states in which
they actually operate.10S The problem is
"that the jurisdiction assumed by state A may involve
unwarranted interference in matters which have little
or nothing to do with state A and are more properly the
concern of state B and therefore more properly left to
its jurisdiction.,,106
Private parties might invoke that concurrent jurisdiction
subjects them to many inconveniences. However, international
law does not deal with the interests of private parties. It
has to be emphasized that general inconvenience to private
parties is not a factor in international law107, but only
state interests are what matters. loa We will recall that the
International Court in the Lotus case also referred to "the
interests of the two states.,,109 By what criteria should the
interests of the "competing" states be assessed?
Reliance on different bases of jurisdiction does not
help finding an answer, since there is no order of supremacy
between the different bases.110 An answer might be found if
one looks at the "basics" of international law, where we
have the principles of sovereign equality and non-interven-
tion or non-interference. The 1970 Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States111 formulates these concepts as fol-
lows:
States have the right "freely to determine, without
external interference ... their political status and to
pursue their economic, social and cultural development
... No state ... has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal
or external affairs of any other state. Consequently,
... all ... forms of interference ..... against the
20
personality of the state or against its political,
economic and cultural elements, are in violation of
international law ...,,112
These principles evidently have implications for jurisdic-
tion,113 because the exercise of jurisdiction may interfere
with another state's "affairs." While these general concepts
of international law do not provide a "clear-cut answer,,,114
it is possible to infer from these general principles a
principle of "balancing of interests.,,115 How such a balanc-
ing test might operate can be illustrated by looking at the
views of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States.
b. the Restatement
§ 40 of the old Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United Statesl16 adopted a balancing test
whereby a state "is required by international law to con-
sider ... moderating the exercise of its ... jurisdiction"
taking into account various factors including state and in-
dividual interests. The latter, such as personal hardship,
are, as mentioned above, irrelevant for deciding sovereignty
conflicts between states.117 The new Restatement
(Revised)118 adopted a somewhat stricter approach: Pursuant
to its § 403 a state "may not exercise jurisdiction ... when
the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable," what is
to be decided in light of a list of factors similar to, but
more extensive than the one of the old Restatement. It sup-
posedly reflects recent case law of United States courts,119
which have become increasingly sensitive to resentments
21
abroad against their using the "effects" doctrine to assume
an extraterritorial reach for their jurisdiction (primarily
in antitrust matters).120 The line of cases runs from the
unrestrictive Alcoa case121 over Timberlane122 to Mannington
Mills,123 which adopted the Timberlane balancing process
approach and identified a list of 10 factors to be consi-
dered:
"1) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2) Nationality of the parties;
3)Relative importance of the alleged violation of con-
duct here compared to that abroad;
4) Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of
litigation there;
5) Existence of intent to harm or affect American com-
merce and its foreseeability;
6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court
exercises jurisdiction and grants relief;
7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed
in the position of being forced to perform an act il-
legal in either country or be under conflicting re-
quirements by both countries;
8) Whether the court can make its order effective;
9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in
this country if made by the foreign nation under simi-
lar circumstances;
10) Whether a treaty with the affected nations has ad-
dressed the issue.,,124
This list of factors is essentially similar to the one adop-
ted by the Restatement (Revised).125 The problem is that the
courts did not necessarily implement international law,126
but rather referred to notions of "comity.,,127 Thus, it is
doubtful whether these decisions constitute state practice
as regards a potential rule of international law. However,
some writers say that "as so often, comity may in truth mean
public international law,,,128 "comity is only another word
for international law.,,129 The Restatement (Revised) also
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considers comity in this context as being "understood not
merely as a matter of discretion but reflecting a sense of
obligation among states.,,130 This has lead some authors to
speak of a change from (mere) comity in the old Restatement,
which is open to political resolution, to a matter of strict
legal rules of competence in the Restatement (Revised).131
However, it should be noted that § 403 (3) of the Restate-
ment (Revised)132 recognizes the possibility that more than
one jurisdiction might be found to be reasonable under its §
403 (2). For those cases, subsection (3) returns to a stan-
dard similar to the soft "should consider" concept of the
old Restatement.133 § 403 (3) only imposes an obligation to
"evaluate" the relevant states' interests, and requires that
a state "should defer to the other state if that state's
interest is clearly greater.,,134
c. criticisms
F.A. Mann decidedly rejects any concept involving the ba-
lancing of interests concept stating that
"it is not the subjective or political interest, but
the objective test of the closeness of connection, of a
sufficiently weighty point of contact between the facts
and their legal assessment that is relevant. The lawyer
balances contacts rather than interests.,,135
He seems to let the closest contact decide.136 This is not
necessarily much different because interests may be regarded
as conferring contacts. One might assume that a state is
interested in a particUlar set of facts only if these facts
have certain contacts to the state; otherwise its interests
would not be involved. Also, the task of weighing contacts
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is not always easier than weighing interests. But it has to
be admitted that courts are ill-suited to "evaluate the eco-
nomic and social policies of a foreign country,,137 in im-
plementing a balancing of interests test as required by Man-
nington Mills.138 For that reason some United States
courts139 have declined to follow this approach. Besides the
decisional difficulties it is probably too much to expect of
a national court to impartially balance home state and
foreign state interests.140 It must also be recalled that in
the context of jurisdiction, private interests, which are
also part of the criticized balancing list,14l are not a
factor under public international law.142 After all, a
scholar appears to be right in stating that the rule of Tim-
berlane and Mannington Mills is not "operable on the level
of international law.,,143
d. the remaining rules
What remains is that the principles of sovereign equality
and non-interference144 require a balancing of state inter-
ests, which is quite open as regards practical consequences.
The implications of the balancing requirement are probably
reflected in the "shall consider moderating the exercise of
jurisdiction" standard of the old Restatement (except that
only state interest factors have to be considered).145
Language similar to that in the old Restatement was adopted
by the International Law Association, which requires that
"[i]n the event of there being concurrent jurisdiction of
two or more states ... each state shall, in applying its own
24
law to conduct in another state, pay due respect to the
major interests and economic policies of such other
state.,,146 More recently, the GECD member states adopted a
statement on Conflicting Requirements Imposed on Multina-
tional Enterprises, which urges the member states "to take
fully into account the sovereignty and legitimate economic,
law enforcement and other interests of other Member coun-
tries.,,147 All these formulations indicate that internation-
al law at the present stage does not appear to prescribe
clear-cut balancing answers yet, but only some balancing of
interests and taking into account of foreign interests at
all.148
In the context of purely civil jurisdiction149 even
these rather vague standards are probably not part of inter-
national law, yet. There, jurisdiction is supposed to be
very much within the discretion of the states, which are
arguably not so much concerned as regards enforcement of
private rights only. Therefore, state interests are not so
much at stake and conflicts not as likely to arise as in the
areas of regulatory (and criminal) jurisdiction. But even as
to civil jurisdiction we have to face concerns, as has been
shown in the section on exorbitant bases.150 As soon as
state interests come into play (and this transition might be
fluent), the obligation to moderate the exercise of juris-
diction arises.
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F. Conclusion
Multiple bases of jurisdiction lead to concurrent jurisdic-
tion of more than one state. As concerns the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction, international law imposes somewhat
modest obligations to moderate the exercise of jurisdiction
by taking into account the interests of the other state(s),
which are protected under the principles of sovereign e-
quality and non-intervention. A balancing of interests test
serves to implement these obligations, but practical conse-
quences are rather open. In the field of purely civil juris-
diction, the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is - at the
present stage of international law - even more within the
discretion of the state. Whether the pessimistic statement
that "conflicts of jurisdiction are likely to remain with us
for a long time to come,,151 is realism, remains to be seen.
For concurrent jurisdiction and conflicts of jurisdiction do
not have to lead to real conflicts for states. Also, they do
not have to lead to conflict situations for the private par-
ties. In the next chapters we will see how institutions of
national laws deal with the possibility of concurrent juris-
diction, and how they try to implement the modest rules of
international law, or at least try to mitigate possible con-
flicts. And conflict avoidance certainly is one objective of
international law. As mentioned earlier, we will classify
the institutions according to defensive, aggressive and pre-
cautionary institutions.
III. DEFENSIVE INSTITUTIONS
This chapter deals with institutions of national laws which
are defensive in character. The term "defensive" relates to
the fact that these institutions may be invoked as a defense
against the bringing of a suit in a certain forum, as well
as to their effect of restraining domestic proceedings
rather than interfering with concurrent foreign proceedings.
A. Forum Non Conveniens
1. In General
"Because the statutory jurisdictional laws in many countries
have traditionally provided little or no flexibility for the
courts to decline jurisdiction, even in cases when the
plaintiff has filed suit in a distant forum that has no sig-
nificant ties to the facts underlying the cause of action,
the courts in several countries have developed or adopted
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.,,152 The defendant may
invoke this doctrine as a defense against the plaintiff's
bringing a suit in "this" forum. Although having jurisdic-
tion, a court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction be-
cause it considers another forum, usually having concurrent
jurisdiction, to be more convenient to handle the dispute.
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2. The United States Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
The United States doctrine goes back to Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert153 where the Supreme Court laid down the following
rules:
1. The decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction is
discretionary.
2. The court should consider "the private interest of
the litigant ... [such as] relative ease of access to
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view
of premises, if view would be appropriate to the ac-
tion; and all other practical problems that make trial
of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive ... [inclu-
ding] enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained."
3. "[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum is rarely to
be disturbed."
4. Factors of public interest to be considered include
"[a]dministrative difficulties ... in congested
[courts] ... [the] local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home," the inappropriateness
of imposing jury duty on "people of a community which
has no relation to the litigation •... [the] ap-
propriateness of having the trial of a diversity case
in a forum that is at home with the state law that must
govern the case ...,,154
As may be seen from the language applied, Gulf Oil only
dealt with an interstate setting. However, its guidelines
were soon applied to international situations as well.155 In
1981, the Supreme Court decided an international case in
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Revno,156 and held that the forum
choice of the plaintiff deserved less deference if he was a
foreigner.157 Courts sometimes also considered additional
public interest factors in international settings, recogniz-
ing concerns that "an inappropriate assertion of jurisdic-
tion not only unduly burdens the forum state's courts but
also infringes on the regulatory prerogatives of the more
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appropriate forum.,,158 Piper also held that a court could
dismiss a suit on forum non conveniens grounds even if the
other forum's laws were less favorable.159 All the last men-
tioned factors facilitate the application of the doctrine in
international cases. However, it should be noted that Piper
does not help a foreign defendant who is sued by an American
plaintiff.160
The basic element of the forum non conveniens test is
the existence of an adaequate alternative forum.16l As men-
tioned above,162 a less favorable law does not render the
foreign forum inadaequate. Although in principle forum non
conveniens questions arise when there is another forum
having concurrent jurisdiction, sometimes the jurisdiction
of the or any other forum may be doubtful. In such cases the
court may condition dismissal on the defendant's submittance
to jurisdiction in the alternative forum. A recent example
was the decision in the tragic gas leak disaster at
Bhopal.163 The Indian plaintiffs sued Union Carbide, the
50.9 percent parent of the Indian company operating the
plant, in the United States. The Court of Appeals confirmed
the decision that India was an adaequate alternative forum
and that a balance of public and private interests favored
litigation there, and upheld the imposition of the condition
that Union Carbide submit to the jurisdiction of the Indian
courts.164 Some critics foresee that foreign plaintiffs
might be encouraged to bring actions in the United States
against United States parent companies in order to obtain
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conditions and thus improve their prospects for recovery
abroad.165 Another condition that might be imposed to assure
that an adaequate remedy is available, is that the defendant
waive any statute of limitations defenses.166
The consequences of granting a forum non conveniens
motion are outright dismissal, dismissal on certain condi-
tions, or stay of dismissal until the court is satisfied
that the imposed conditions are met.167
3. European Convention
The convention168 does not provide for a forum non
conveniens defense. On the contrary, every discretion in
applying its jurisdiction rules is excluded. Where a court
has jurisdiction under Art. 2, 5 or 6, it cannot decline
jurisdiction in favor of an allegedly more convenient
forum.169 The jurisdictional rules of the Convention apply
as regards suits against domiciliaries of a contracting
party. In actions against other persons outside the realm of
the Convention the relevant laws of the member state
apply,170 and they may provide for a doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Let us look at two token member states' laws,
namely English and German law.
4. England
English law made considerations similar to forum non con-
veniens considerations part of a decision to deny
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jurisdiction but they were not labeled forum non conveniens.
The entitlement to initiate proceedings in England is "sub-
ject to a [inherent] power in the court to stay such pro-
ceedings in a proper case so that similar proceedings might
be brought in another jurisdiction.,,171 Earlier decisions
justified staying an action on the grounds of "oppressive"
or "vexatious" conduct.172 The Atlantic Star173 and Mac
Shannon174 liberalized the rule, and in the latter case Lord
Diplock introduced the following formula establishing cri-
teria similar to the United States doctrine:
"In order to justify a stay two conditions must be sa-
tisfied, one positive and the other negative:
(a) the defendant must satisfy the court that there is
another forum to whose jurisdiction he is amenable in
which justice can be done between the parties at sub-
stantially less inconvenience or expense, and
(b) the stay must not deprive the plaintiff of a legit-
imate personal or juridical advantage which would be
available to him if he invoked the jurisdiction of the
English court.,,175
Although the closeness to the Scottish doctrine of forum non
conveniens was recognized,176 it took another case, The
Abidin Daver177 of 1984, for Lord Diplock to admit that -
and we should note the use of the term comity -
"judicial chauvinism has been replaced by judicial com-
ity to an extent which I think the time is now ripe to
acknowledge frankly is, in the field of law with which
this appeal is concerned, indistinguishable from the
Scottish legal doctrine of forum non conveniens. ,,178
That judicial chauvinism stood "at a discount,,179 is also
reflected by the notion of a "need to avoid comparison bet-
ween English and foreign courts.,,180
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Although English law "went scotch,,181, Lord Goff hesi-
tated to use the Scotch label "forum non conveniens" in the
recent case spiliada,182 because "the question is not one of
[mere practical] convenience, but of the suitability or ap-
propriateness of the relevant jurisdiction.,,183 He neverthe-
less formulated the latest position of the law as follows:
"The basic principle is that a stay will only be gran-
ted on the ground of forum non conveniens where the
court is satisfied that there is some other available
forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the ap-
propriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in
which the case may be tried more suitably for the in-
terests of all the parties and the ends of justice.,,184
He also reaffirmed that the general burden of proof is cast
upon the defendant.185 Similar to Piper186 the mere fact
that a stay would deprive the plaintiff of an advantage in
proceedings in England, such as higher damages or discovery
rules, "cannot be decisive.,,18?
5. Federal Republic of Germany
In Germany the doctrine of forum non conveniens is disputed.
The Bavarian Supreme Court categorically stated that "the
principle of 'forum non conveniens' does not exist in German
law.,,188 However, some family courts decline jurisdiction
when, for special reasons, a foreign court appears to be
more "suitable.,,189 The BUndesgerichtshof190 has not dealt
with this question yet. But some decisions indicate that the
concept of an "inherent competence" limits the extent of
jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction may be declined where the
foreign law which had to be applied would demand court
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action which is totally different from the inherent scope of
activity of a German court.191 In a case where the foreign
law to be applied by the German court was the Italian law on
"separation of table and bed," the Bundesgerichtshof held
the application of these Italian rules not to be totally
different from the activity of a German court applying the
German rules on "divorce.,,192 The limitation by inherent
competence may obviously only apply in very rare circumstan-
ces.193
6. Evaluation
The forum non conveniens doctrine is criticized by some
American scholars who think that it is too discretionary and
unpredictable,194 that the same considerations could be ap-
plied at another stage of determining court-access in formal
jurisdictional doctrine195 or that there is "no valid con-
tinuing role for forum non conveniens, only a repetitive
one," because the relevant private and public factors "are
best considered in the jurisdictional contexts" of personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction (for example
Timberlane196).197
Contrary to these objections, there is a distinct func-
tion for forum non conveniens, because it is an "important
tool with which courts can fashion wise decisions on the
exercise of jurisdiction.,,198 And what is wise is not neces-
sarily required by international or constitutional law.199
Thus, the doctrine allows the moderation of the exercise of
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jurisdiction even where international law would not impose
limits. One can only agree with the statement of one scholar
that the forum non conveniens doctrine "cuts down local
parochialism as regards judicial adjudication, and is con-
sistent with a spirit of international legal cohesion and
integration.,,200 It provides at least the opportunity to
avoid potential conflicts by excluding parallel proceedings
as between the two fora concerned. It is only to be hoped
that the doctrine will not be applied one-sidedly, that is
lead to dismissal in favor of a home state defendant and to
retention of jurisdiction in favor of a home state plain-
tiff.201
B. Lis Pendens Theories
1. In General
Recognition of foreign lis pendens202 means that where a
suit is pending in one forum "the other" forum will not ac-
cept or proceed with a (second) suit brought before it in
the same dispute. A typical situation may be that the defen-
dant in the foreign forum sues in his domestic forum for a
declaratory judgment denying the rights assumed by the
plaintiff in the foreign forum.
Differing philosophies or views as to parallel proceed-
ings in general influence the establishment of any kind of
lis pendens doctrine. Views differ even among various united
States courts. Some want to "discourage redundant suits,
34
both to save the time consumed by the resultant multiplicity
of actions, and to avoid the unnecessary annoyance and ex-
pense to litigants in prosecuting or defending independent
suits comprehending the same subject matter. ,,203 Others do
not want to interfere with the plaintiff's forum choice204,
or generally think that "parallel proceedings on the same in
personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed
simultaneously, at least until a judgment is reached in one
which can be pled as ~ judicata in the other.,,205 The lat-
ter reservation helps to avoid conflicting judgments, but
there are still the concerns of double cost and use of court
resources.206 Also, as has been recognized in an English de-
cision, there might be "an ugly rush to get one action deci-
ded ahead of the other, in order to create a situation of
res judicata or issue estoppel in the latter.,,20? This "ugly
rush" may mean that every party will try to push the procee-
dings in the country where his chances to win are allegedly
more favorable, and conversely try to delay the proceedings
in the other country.208 Much seems to speak in favor of
some kind of lis pendens theory.
2. Distinct Procedural APproach
Here, we will look at approaches dealing with the pendency
of litigation in a foreign forum in a separate legal in-
stitution, as opposed to concepts making pendency only one
factor in a decision on the exercise of jurisdiction
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pursuant to other concepts, which will be the subject of
subchapter 3 below.
a. United States
In the United states there is an approach which may be
labeled "stay because of pending action.,,209 This encompas-
ses "merely a temporary cessation" of proceedings awaiting
the outcome of foreign proceedings (which may lead to re-
sumption of the domestic proceedings if the foreign court
does not render a judgment that may be pled as res
judicata).210 It has to be distinguished from "abatement"
which applies within the same state jurisdiction only and
leads to complete dismissal.211 Thus, a foreign lis pendens
will not bar a new action, but the court may stay the pro-
ceeding in the forum. The decision to stay is not a matter
of right but of discretion.212 Considerations to be taken
into account are whether all the relief sought is obtainable
in the other forum so that there is no legitimate interest
of the plaintiff to bring two actions, whether the parties
and the issues are the same so that the eventual foreign
judgment would be recognized and bar a domestic suit, that
the domestic suit has not been commenced prior to the
foreign suit.213 The underlying rationale is the protection
of the defendant from vexatious and harassing litigation,
the prevention of (unnecessary) multiplicity of actions, and
also judicial comity.214 An interesting aspect, countering
the pro-parallelists' argument of non-interference with the
plaintiff's choice215 and understanding the implications of
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a setting of multiple jurisdiction, has been formulated by
the Delaware Supreme Court:
"as a general rule, litigation should be confined to
the forum in which it is first commenced, and a defen-
dant should not be permitted to defeat the plaintiff's
choice of forum in a pending suit by commencing litiga-
tion involving the same cause of action in another
jurisdiction of its own choosing; ... that these con-
cepts [of stay] are impelled by considerations of com-
ity and efficient administration of justice.,,216
Some of the considerations resemble the criteria applied in
a forum non conveniens decision. The relationship between
forum non conveniens and the power to stay because of pend-
ing action was convincingly discussed in the same Delaware
decision: Where the foreign suit has been commenced prior to
the domestic suit, the court may grant a stay by reason of a
prior action pending in another jurisdiction; where the do-
mestic suit was instituted first, the forum non conveniens
standards apply.217
As mentioned above, both judicial and doctrinal views
in the United States are not uniform, and some courts have
denied the power to stay because of pending action.218 Espe-
cially where an action is pending in a foreign country, the
law appears to be quite uncertain, because most of the case-
law deals with an interstate setting. Nevertheless the
courts use language which could equally apply in an interna-
tional context, such as "between sovereign jurisdictions ...
a matter of comity,,,219 but jurisdiction is meant to cover
other states (not nations). An older New York case excluded
the application of the stay concept to cases "pending in a
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country in which the system of jurisprudence was not so
closely analogous to our own [as the English system.],,220
This somewhat chauvinistic view has been relinquished or at
least mitigated. Recently a New York court considered a stay
with regard to a pending action in Mexico (and denied it on
grounds of non-identity of the actions).221 But it is prob-
ably still true that systems in the tradition of English law
are preferentially treated. This is partly due to the rela-
tion between the concept of stay and the law on recognition
of foreign judgments. In Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya)
Ltd.222 the court discussed in detail the Texas law on re-
cognition and that the elements are "more likely to be met
... for judgments from favored systems [like the English
model system].,,223 After having concluded that the English
judgment would be recognized, the court stayed the Texas
proceedings because the English proceedings were not termi-
nated yet, since an appeal pending. It should be noted that
the court, without further considerations, just adopted the
reasoning of earlier decisions on stay of proceedings pend-
ing an appeal in the "other" forum in a context of inter-
state or state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction,
and applied it to the international case before it.224
Concluding, we may say that united States law recog-
nizes a concept of lis pendens, which is in principle and
increasingly in praxi also applicable to an international
situation. 225
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b. European Convention
(1) Art. 21 of the Convention226 sets forth the rules on lis
pendens. Pursuant to Art. 21 (1), "[w]here proceedings in-
volving the same cause of action and between the same par-
ties are brought in the courts of different Contracting
States, any court other than the court first seised shall of
its own motion decline jurisdiction in favour of that
court." Only termination or discontinuance of the first ac-
tion enables the "second" court to exercise jurisdiction.227
As opposed to this non-discretionary rule, Art. 21 (2) gives
the court discretion to "stay its proceedings if the juris-
diction of the other court is contested."
(2) Probably in recognition of potential difficulties in
determining the identity of proceedings,228 Art. 22 provides
for discretionary stay or dismissal of non-identical but
related actions by the court subsequently seised.
c. France
Under French law the pendency of an action abroad tradition-
ally was no valid defense to a suit,229 as French law equal-
ly was hostile to recognition of foreign judgments.230 This
is probably due to the French courts' desire to "extend
their own competence as far as possible.,,231 More recently,
some turn of the trend has been indicated by decisions and
writers.232 The new trend to facilitate recognition of
foreign lis pendens probably ensued from the abandonment of
the restictive "revision au fond" as concerns recognition of
foreign judgments.233 The evolution is still going on, but
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at least as concerns judgments of courts of countries with
which France has entered into treaties on competence or ju-
risdiction the "exception de litispendence" seems to be
recognized. 234
d. Federal Republic of Germany
Instead of a sound doctrine of forum non conveniens, German
law provides for non-discretionary dismissal of actions in
cases of a foreign lis pendens. Prerequisite for such a dis-
missal is that the expected foreign judgment would be recog-
nized in Germany.235 Also, parties and subject matter must
be the same in both proceedings.236 An interesting exception
to the general recognition of lis pendens should be noted.
In a divorce case the defense of foreign lis pendens was
rejected, because the proceedings pending at the Italian
court did not proceed at all (were pending for over 4 years)
and the rights of the husband must not be affected in an
unreasonable way, since the principles of good faith and
unconscionability apply to procedure, too.237 The reason-
ableness was measured according to the relief obtainable at
the home forum. This resembles the United States law re-
quirement that the other forum mu~t provide complete
relief.238
3. "One among other factors" Approach
Here, the pendency of litigation in another forum is not
recognized in a distinct institution of lis pendens but is
40
just made one factor in a decision on the exercise of juris-
diction under other concepts.
a. United States
We have already mentioned the Mannington Mills balancing
test as to whether (extraterritorial) antitrust jurisdiction
should be exercised or not.239 One of the factors to be con-
sidered in making the balancing test decision is the penden-
cy of litigation abroad.240 This may lead to dismissal be-
cause of a decision not to exercise jurisdiction.
b. England
English law considers the pendency of proceedings in another
forum one factor in determining whether to stay proceedings
on (now)241 forum non conveniens grounds. It will "often be
a very weighty factor,,,242 leading in most cases to a stay
of proceedings. But the discretionary character of the deci-
sion should be kept in mind. In the realm of the European
Convention,243 the strict lis pendens rules of Art. 21 of
the Convention apply.
4. Evaluation
Recognition of foreign lis pendens certainly avoids poten-
tial conflicts - between states or the parties because of
conflicting judgments - because there is only one proceeding
allowed to go on. Reasonable considerations of consistency
within the own domestic system and of (international) con-
flict avoidance strongly suggest that a foreign lis pendens
should be recognized where the forum would recognize the
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expected foreign judgment, since in that situation the do-
mestic action (that is the part of the proceedings until the
foreign judgment is rendered and can be pled as res judica-
ta) will have been in vain anyway.244 This argument at least
applies to those systems where a domestic lis pendens does
not bar the recognition of foreign judgments.245 Where the
eventual foreign judgment may be pled as res judicate in a
domestic action, it seems to be commended by logic and com-
mon sense not to waste judicial resources, but rather stop
the domestic proceedings in the beginning. The dependance of
the recognition of foreign lis pendens on the recognition of
the eventual judgment is part of some approaches, both dis-
cretionary (United States) and non-discretionary (Germany)
ones. It raises the problem of predicting whether recogni-
tion will be granted or not.246 Also, it is not always easy
to determine whether subject matter and parties are identi-
cal in both actions. To counterbalance any uncertainty, it
appears preferable to only stay the domestic action. This is
also the approach of the Convention when jurisdiction is
contested.247 For otherwise there is the risk that the
plaintiff be deprived of his rights by dismissal, where a
statute of limitations has run before the bar of lis pendens
has been removed and wherefore a new action can no longer be
successful. 248
The recognition of foreign lis pendens is a good way to
avoid that two fora deal with a certain dispute at the same
time, and thus to avoid conflicting orders or judgments.
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C. Recognition of Foreign Judgments
1. Res Judicata Effect of Foreign Judgments
a. In general
In a situation of concurrent jurisdiction the "loser" of a
suit may try to start a new suit in the other jurisdiction.
The doctrine of res judicata eliminates this possibility by
recognizing and accepting the earlier foreign judgment as a
bar to a new suit.249 Public international law does not
require a state to recognize foreign judgments,250 which is
understandable because states are quite free to assume ju-
risdiction in civil matters.251 Courts may assume jurisdic-
tion and render judgments in circumstances where the recog-
nizing state would perceive the assertion of jurisdiciton to
be overreaching and therefore not be willing to recognize
the rendered judgment. An obligation to recognize all judg-
ments rendered by another state would only be accepted by
states if the foreign court rendering a judgment had assumed
jurisdiction according to agreed upon or accepted standards
of jurisdiction, as was done on a regional plane in the
European Convention. There is no such harmonization on the
international plane. Recognition thus lies within the
"friendly discretion" of the nations.
b. United States
"Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment 'on the mer-
its' in a prior suit involving the same parties bars a
second suit based on the same cause of action.,,252 This
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statement of the Supreme Court referred to a situation
within the same jurisdiction. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution253 generally re-
quires recognition of sister state judgments,254 but it is
not applicable to foreign country judgments.255 However,
this does not mean that the policies underlying the recogni-
tion of sister state judgments do not - at least partially -
apply to foreign country judgments as well.
"Public policy dictates that there be an end of litiga-
tion.,,256 This consideration behind res judicata applies to
all judgments, whether they are local or foreign.257 The
Supreme Court took the same view as early as 1821,258 and
the doctrine of res judicata as to foreign judgments was
also espoused by the dissenting four justices in Hilton v.
GUyot.259 The majority opinion did not consider the res ju-
dicata doctrine but made recognition and enforcement subject
to international comity and certain conditions (shortly to
be dealt with). But in fact there is no difference as to
results: the proponents of the res judicata doctrine also
employ new policy factors at the foreign judgments level,260
taking into account the diversity existing between the vari-
ous legal systems.261 These considerations lead to generally
the same defenses or limitations as are applicable under the
comity approach. Since in effect all give res judicata ef-
fect to foreign judgments, also Hilton,262 the concept and
label of res judicata appear to be preferable.
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Some limitations are inherent in the concept of res
judicata. The cause of action, and the parties must be the
same.263 Other limitations are more independent. The foreign
court must have had jurisdiction, which will be determined
not only by the foreign law but also under United States
jurisdictional notions of fairness and due process.264 Simi-
larly, there must have been an actual opportunity for the
party to be heard, that is a full and fair trial.265 Justice
to the parties also requires that the judgment be not con-
trary to natural justice or procured by fraud.266 Fraud
means only "extrinsic" fraud, which could not have been pas-
sed upon by the foreign court. A typical example is that the
plaintiff fraudulently induces the defendant not to defend
himself by saying that the action is being withdrawn.267 If
not already covered by the other exceptions dealt with,268
the foreign judgment must not be contrary to public
policy.269 The mere difference of laws applicable in the two
fora cannot render a judgment contrary to public policy;270
the cause of action the judgment is based on must violate
"our fundamental notions of what is decent and just.,,271
Reese suggests that
"only a real necessity to safeguard American citizens
or institutions will be sufficient to override the com-
pelling reasons behind the doctrine of res
judicata. ,,272 --
The most controversial exception to recognition is the ele-
ment of reciprocity, which was first asserted in Hilton.273
Newer state court274 and federal court275 decisions in
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non-federal-question cases have refused to follow Hilton.
This refusal implies that recognition is a matter of state
law.276 The better arguments speak in favor of rejecting re-
ciprocity as a precondition to recognition. For, using the
words of the Minnesota Supreme Court, "Hilton mandates a
misplaced retaliation against judgment creditors for acts of
foreign states irrelevant to their cases and over which they
had no control.,,277 Also, the objective of bringing an end
to litigation and conserving judicial energies should pre-
vail.278 The Restatement on the conflict of laws also rejec-
ted the reciprocity doctrine,279 and stated that the great
majority of state and federal courts have done so.280 After
all it seems justified to say that reciprocity was only a
"temporary adventure. ,,281
The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
(1962) has been adopted by sixteen states as of 1988.282 It
purports to state what is believed to be the United States
common law rule.283 Reciprocity is not a precondition of
recognition under the Act.284 The United States is not party
to any bilateral or multilateral conventions on the recogni-
tion of ~oreign country judgments.285
There remains the question of the finality of the
foreign judgment. The Uniform Act286 considers final a judg-
ment even though an appeal is pending in the foreign juris-
diction. The consequence in such a situation is stay of pro-
ceedings rather than dismissal because of res judicata.287
Stay is also the consequence of the doctrine of lis pendens
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in the United States.288 The situation that an appeal is
pending appears to belong to the concept of lis pendens.
Both the legal consequence of stay and the obvious relation-
ship to the doctrine of lis pendens make it advisable to
deal with the situation of a pending appeal already in the
context of lis pendens theories.289
Summing up, we may say that United States courts in
general give res judicata effect to foreign country judg-
ments under very much the same liberal conditions that apply
to sister state judgments.290
c. European Convention
The European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters follows the
German approach of "automatic" recognition giving res judi-
cata effect without formal procedure.291 The grounds for
refusal of recognition are exhaustively enumerated in Art.
27, including the public policy reservation, or that the
judgment was given in default and the defendant was not
properly (timely) served.292 Art. 29 prohibits any review as
to substance. As a change from traditional rules on recogni-
tion, the foreign judgment may not be reviewed as to juris-
diction, which is expressly stated in Art. 28 (3). One rea-
son might be the confidence in the clear and uniform rules
on jurisdiction under the Convention.293 However, an oddity
arises because pursuant to Art. 28 (3) and Art. 4 (2) the
rule of non-jurisdictional-review applies also to judgments
(by member states) against defendants not domiciled in a
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member state, which are rendered according to the local
rules of jurisdiction including any exorbitant bases which
the Convention abolished as to member state domiciliaries.
This "unfortunate" result is understandably criticized,294
since the non EEC domiciled defendant is "at the mercy of
the judgment granting court and cannot get any relief on
jurisdictional grounds at the [recognition and] enforcement
stage.,,295
d. England
An English scholar has stated that English courts "uphold
the principle of res judicata, to the inherent absurdity of
enforcing a foreign judgment which is known to be contrary
to English law.,,296 Indeed, the power of English courts to
reopen foreign judgments is strictly limited. Judgments are
recognized if they are not procured by fraud, not contrary
to public policy or natural justice (including due process
notions), and if the foreign court asserted jurisdiction on
a basis recognized in England.297 This looks quite similar
to the United States rules. It should be noted that the con-
cept of fraud is not limited to extrinsic fraud,298 and that
reciprocity is not required.
e. France
French law traditionally was hostile to the recognition of
foreign judgments. An ordinance of 1629 prohibited the ex-
ecution of foreign judgments and demanded that the matter be
litigated anew.299 Later, judgments became enforceable but
were subject to examination of the merits.300 This doctrine
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of "revision au fond," which required a French court to re-
view the merits of the foreign judgment to be recognized,
was strongly criticized and finally relinquished by Munzer
v. Dame Jacoby-Munzer in 1964.301 Instead a concept of "con-
trole" was established302 and it requires the following:
- the foreign court had jurisdiction over the case (both
international jurisdiction according to French standards and
internal jurisdiction according to the foreign forum's stan-
dards)303
- the court applied the proper law according to French
choice of law rules304
- the enforcement of the judgment will not violate French
"ordre public" (public policy)305
- no legal fraud is involved (meaning for example the chang-
ing of nationality or domicile in order to influence the
choice of law).306
Except as to the choice of law requirement these are some-
what familiar elements.
f. Federal Republic of Germany
§ 328 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) sets forth
the grounds for refusing recognition. Despite numerous
criticisms by legal writers307 the conflict of laws reform
1986 has retained the reciprocity requirement in § 328 (1)
No.5 ZPO. At least, the Federal Supreme Court has liberal-
ized the application of the reciprocity requirement over the
years: The foreign country does not have to have the same
conditions for recognition as Germany, but it suffices that
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the terms of the foreign country in recognizing a German
judgment are as a whole essentially equivalent or less
stringent than the respective German ones.308 Also, it is
not necessary that all types of German judgments be recog-
nized abroad.309 Partial reciprocity as to the particular
class of judgment at issue is sufficient.310 As regards
money judgments from the United states, the only states
which would not pass the reciprocity test are probably Mon-
tana, Florida and Mississippi.311
The other requirements for recognition correspond to
the common law rules, including elements such as jurisdic-
tion of the foreign court (measured by German standards),
adequate service of process, and public policy.312
2. The So-Called "Second Lis Pendens Theory"
As an exception to the rule of recognition of foreign judg-
ments, the "second lis pendens theory" poses the question
whether a domestic lis pendens may bar the recognition of a
foreign judgment. This presupposes that parallel actions
have been taken in the recognition forum and abroad.313
One view refuses recognition of the foreign judgment
when a domestic suit is pending, irrespective of which suit
was initiated first. This approach is taken by Art. 797 (1)
No.6 of the Italian Code of Civil procedure,314 and it pro-
bably is the French rule as well.315 This apparent prefe-
rence for domestic proceedings bars recognition even if the
foreign suit was started first, which is "open to serious
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objections.,,316 For once, this enables a party to avoid or
postpone the recognition of a foreign judgment by merely
suing in the recognition forum on the same matter before the
foreign decision becomes res judicata.317 It deprives the
concept of recognition of foreign judgments of a great part
of its role in avoiding duplicate proceedings. Moreover, it
appears inconsequent if one accepts the lis pendens
theory.318 The following approach seems preferable: One
should distinguish as to whether the domestic or the foreign
suit was instituted first. In the former case the foreign
judgment should not be recognized,319 in the latter case it
should.320 It is only consistent to demand observance of its
own lis pendens and refuse recognition to judgments rendered
in disregard thereof, and on the other hand not to deny re-
cognition if the foreign suit was started first.321 This
rule was adopted by the 1966 Hague Convention on the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments.322 Thus, the
action first instituted should receive preference in a situ-
ation where one action is pending and the other has already
led to a judgment. United States law probably follows the
same approach that the action first initiated prevails.323
3. Worst Case Scenario: Two Conflicting Judgments
Since not all countries employ the same rules or doctrines
to avoid duplicate proceedings, it might happen that the
parties are confronted with inconsistent judgments from dif-
ferent countries. If the plaintiff seeks recognition and
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enforcement, which judgment should prevail? A comparative
study concluded that there is a "lack of a general agree-
ment" on the question whether the first or the last judgment
is to be honored.324 It is no wonder that there is a lack of
agreement, since even systematic deliberations face a dilem-
ma: A consequent solution as concerns lis pendens theories
would require that the proceedings first instituted be given
preference, as was suggested with regard to the "second lis
pendens theory" above. On the other hand, one has to con-
sider the res judicata effect of the judgment first
rendered, which would suggest a first-in-time-judgment rule.
A third consideration leads to even another solution, namely
that the res judicata effect of the first judgment was con-
sidered in the second proceedings and that the decision
there constitutes res judicata as to the res judicata effect
of the first judgment. Corresponding to these somewhat in-
conciliable considerations it is understandable that dif-
ferent countries have adopted different rules. Yet another
factor has to be taken into account. As we have already
seen, the policy of some systems prefers domestic judgments.
In looking at some approaches, we should distinguish two
situations, namely whether enforcement is sought in one of
the judgment countries or in a third country.
a. recognition and enforcement in one of the countries
having rendered one of the judgments
A general proposition is that a foreign judgment will not be
recognized if it conflicts with a prior adjudication in the
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recognition state.325 This was justified long ago on the
grounds that foreign judgments may not be binding on the
internal legal regime if they deny internal acts of state
(that is internal judgments).326 In this sense, French
courts supposedly give preference to their own judgments if
they were rendered prior to the foreign judgment, since the
later foreign judgment inconsistent with the already ren-
dered domestic judgment is held to be contrary to public
policy. 327
Some countries generally prefer their own forum judg-
ments irrespective of when they were rendered. This is the
law in the Germany as stated in the newly revised328 § 328
(1) No.3 zpo,329 and in Italy, pursuant to Art. 797 No.5 of
the Italian Code of Civil procedure.330 English law is the
same.331 Further Art. 27 (3) of the European convention332
excludes recognition if the judgment conflicts with a judg-
ment rendered in the recognition state irrespective of the
time it was rendered.333 This preference for home country
judgments furthers "domestic legal security,,,334 but it was
rightly criticized as not serving "comity nor judicial econ-
omy.,,335
United States law does not follow any domestic judgment
preference rule, but applies a last-in-time rule irrespec-
tive of the country of origin. The last-in-time rule as to
inconsistent sister-state judgments was established by the
Supreme Court in Treinies v. Sunshine Min. co.336 on the
grounds that the later decision had disposed of the issue of
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res judicata effect of the former judgment (which reflects
our third systematic consideration above).33? That the later
court evidently failed to accord res judicata effect to the
first judgment is outweighed by the fact that this issue
could be raised in the second action and the determination
by the second court is authoritative (res judicata effect as
to the issue of res judicata of the first judgment).338 Some
find it uncertain whether this rule also applies where
foreign country judgments are involved.339 But there are a
few decisions holding so.340 Two cases illustrating both a
prior domestic and a prior foreign judgment situation, are
Perkins v. Benguet Consolo Mining co.,341 giving res judi-
cata effect to a New York judgment that held that a prior
Philippine judgment would not be recognized because of
fraud, and Perkins v. De Witt,342 giving preference to a
later Philippine judgment over a prior New York judgment. It
should be noted that the logic employed by the United States
courts is faulty if the later judgment was rendered by a
forum that does not apply res judicata, and arguably in
these situations the last judgment should not control.343
b. recognition and enforcement in a third country
This paragraph deals with the situation where two foreign
judgments "compete" for recognition in a third country and a
domestic judgment preference argument accordingly cannot
apply.
As mentioned, the united States last-in-time rule ap-
plies uniformly to all situations of conflicting judgments
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irrespective of the country of origin. An example of the
application of the last-in-time rule where the United States
is the third country, is Ambatielos v. Foundation Co.,344
giving preference to a later English judgment over a prior
Greek one.
On the side of the first-in-time rule as regards two
conflicting foreign judgments we find Art. 27 (5) of the
European Convention,345 which precludes recognition if a
prior decision of a nonmember state (which is recognizable)
conflicts with the decision seeking recognition. In the
event of two conflicting judgments of two other member
states the Convention is silent, but some suggest that the
earlier judgment should prevail.346 Against criticisms by
few writers347 German law also adheres to the first-in-time
rule as recently confirmed in § 328 (1) No.3 ZPO.348 For a
first-in-time rule speaks that it "deters post-judgment
forum shopping.,,349
Whatever the rule as to conflicting judgments is, for
the sake of international cooperation and equality one
should follow the proposal of one author demanding that "it
ought to apply equally to foreign and domestic judg-
ments.,,350 Unfortunately, quite some systems still apply a
domestic judgment preference policy that is reflected in our
distinguishing the two situations a. and b. above.
c. "enforcement shopping"
As we have seen, the rules on enforcement in a situation of
conflicting judgments are different in different countries.
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This opens the stage for "enforcement shopping" because the
plaintiff may look for a country with favorable rules. Of
course, first he has to consider the availability of assets
of the defendant in the country where he wants enforcement
to take place. Whether the defendant can interfere with this
process will be seen later.351
4. Evaluation
The dubious notion that impeding recognition of foreign
judgments will somehow benefit local judgment debtors and
indirectly the state granting recognition,352 fortunately
appears to find fewer and fewer proponents as time passes.
Reciprocity is still a requirement for recognition in some
systems, but instead of raising the general standard of be-
havior (by inducing states to grant recognition if they want
their own judgments to be recognized), reciprocity probably
tends to generalize a lower standard.353 For the "chain,,354
of reciprocity cannot be broken if no country is prepared to
be the first to grant recognition without reciprocity. Thus,
the fact that England, France and most United States courts
have relinquished the reciprocity requirement is welcome
news. An interesting proposal made by some scholars sets
forth a connection between recognition and the law of juris-
diction and suggests that in order to avoid possible con-
flicts with other jurisdictions a forum should assume juris-
diction only where its judgment would be recognized by
foreign countries.355 If this were followed, a uniform
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standard of jurisdiction would be likely to evolve,
facilitate recognition, and minimize conflicts. It was
rightly said that recognition of foreign judgments and ju-
risdiction of foreign courts are "branches of the same
tree,,,356 and the one may influence or even constitute state
practice as to the other. As far as we have seen, state
practice is on the way to a liberal recognition practice
which avoids conflicts and conflicting judgments which
nobody desires.
IV. AGGRESSIVE INSTITUTIONS - MEANS FOR COUNTERING SUITS
CO~ENCED BY OPPOSING PARTIES
This chapter will deal with institutions which allow a party
to counter proceedings instituted by the opposing party in a
foreign country. The Common Law antisuit injunction is the
main institution to be looked at. Civil law achieves e-
quivalent effects by means of a substantive law action for
an order to discontinue foreign proceedings. Other means are
anti enforcement injunctions, and actions for a declaratory
judgment denying the benefits of the foreign proceedings.
These institutions are called aggressive because they are
employed to counter foreign proceedings and tend to inter-
fere with the activities of foreign courts.
A. Antisuit Injunctions
1. In General
The term "antisuit injunction" is meant to cover injunctions
requiring a party not to commence, or not to continue pro-
ceedings in a foreign court.357 Such injunctions are a Com-
mon Law institution, going back to the conflicts between
Equity and the Common Law. At the time of Henry VI. it had
become clear that the law could not be modified by equitable
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principles, unless the Chancellor, or the Court of Chancery,
could restrain parties from proceeding "at law." This was,
of course, opposed by the Common Law courts. But since James
I. issued an order in favor of the Chancery in 1616, the
latter's equitable power to issue such injunctions seemed to
be established.358 The equitable remedy of anti suit injunc-
tions was ready to develop and became a device for restrain-
ing foreign proceedings.
2. The English Doctrine
In the old decision Lord Portarlington v. Selby,359 the
court granted an injunction restraining a person from bring-
ing an action in Ireland in regard of a dishonored bill of
exchange given in respect of a gambling debt which would be
invalid by English law. In justifying the decision Lord
Brougham, L.C. stated:
"..• the injunction was not directed to the foreign
Court but to the party within the jurisdiction here .
•.• If the Court can command him to bring home goods
from abroad, ••. in precisely the like manner it can
restrain the party .•. from doing anything abroad,,360
The more recent case Castanho v. Brown & Root361 assimilated
the criteria for granting a forum non conveniens stay362 and
for granting an injunction. Lord Scarman said:
"The principle is the same whether the remedy sought is
a stay of English proceedings or a restraint upon fo-
reign proceedings.,,363
Thus, if it could be established that England was the more
convenient forum, an injunction would issue, provided that
-
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the plaintiff in the foreign court would not be deprived of
a legitimate advantage.364 This approach of issuing an in-
junction constituting a kind of binding forum non conveniens
decision as to the other forum appears rather "arrogat-
ive,,,365 considering the broad discretion for a forum non
conveniens decision.366 It fails to recognize the difference
between controlling proceedings before English courts and
interfering with proceedings subject to the jurisdiction of
a foreign court.367 Understandably, the House of Lord felt
somewhat uneasy with this, and in South Carolina Insurance
co.368 Lord Brandon stated that the High Court has power to
issue anti suit injunctions, but that "[s]uch jurisdiction
is, however, to be exercised with caution because it invol-
ves indirect interference with the process of the foreign
court concerned.,,369
In the recent S.N.I.A.S. case,370 the Privy Council
took the opportunity of clarifying, redeveloping (looking at
old cases) and restating the English law in this area.37l It
departed from any forum ~ conveniens assimilations, and
Lord Goff stated the new approach to be:
"[w]here a remedy ••• is available both in the English
•.• court and in a foreign court, the English .• court
will, generally speaking, only restrain the plaintiff
from pursuing proceeedings in the foreign court if such
pursuit would be vexatious or oppressive. This presup-
poses that, as a general rule, the English ... court
.•• provides the natural forum for the trial of the
action; and further, since the court is concerned with
the ends of justice, that account must be taken not
only of injustice to the defendant if the plaintiff is
allowed to pursue the foreign proceedings, but also of
injustice to the plaintiff if he is not allowed to do
so. So, as a general rule, the court will not grant an
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injunction if .•. it will deprive the plaintiff of ad-
vantages in the foreign forum of which it would be un-
just to deprive him.,,372
Special rules apply to "single forum" cases, that is where
there is no cause of action in the English court. These are
particularly sensitive as regards the plaintiff, because if
the action begun abroad can be heard only in the foreign
court, it is a strong thing to enjoin the foreign proceed-
ings.373 As regards state interests, however, there is no
difference to the normal "alternative fora" cases, since the
fact that there is no cause of action in England reflects
English regulatory policy and is exercise of jurisdiction as
well.374 As to such cases, the ruling of the House of Lords
in the Laker case375 is still authoritative.376 For an in-
junction to issue, the party must show a right not to be
sued in the foreign court. This right may be derived from a
contract (for example an exclusive jurisdiction clause377)
or from the fact that to sue would constitute "uncon-
scionable" conduct in the eye of English law.378 The dif-
ference between unconscionable and vexatious conduct is hard
to detect, and it has been suggested that in substance the
rules in alternative and single forum cases are at least
remarkably similar.379
3. United States Law
United States courts appear even more reluctant than their
English counterpart to issue injunctions restraining foreign
proceedings.380 This is the rule at least under the approach
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as applied by Judge wilkey in the American side of the Laker
case.381 In simplified terms,382 the case went as follows:
The British airline Laker Airways brought an action under
antitrust laws in a United States court against British,
American, and other companies. Other airlines obtained an
injunction from the English Court of Appeal enjoining Laker
from pursuing similar proceedings in United States courts
against them.383 Then, the United States court enjoined Uni-
ted States and other airlines from joining the English pro-
ceedings perceived to frustrate the proceedings in the Uni-
ted States.384 This state of conflicting injunctions was
finally resolved when the House of Lord discharged the in-
junction granted by the Court of Appeal in the decision men-
tioned above.385
Judge Wilkey, in affirming the United States antisuit
injunction, thoroughly elaborated on the United States law
on such injunctions. Despite the actual clashes across the
Atlantic, the language applied is quite restrictive. At the
outset, he makes clear that because of the indirect inter-
ference with the foreign court's jurisdiction
"only in the most compelling circumstances does a court
have discretion to issue an antisuit injunction.,,386
Therefore,387 factors to be considered in a forum non con-
veniens decision, such as the prevention of duplicative and
therefore vexatious litigation, which call for dismissal of
the "own" proceedings, are not sufficient grounds to
restrain foreign proceedings:
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"The policies underlying this rule ... do not outweigh
the important principles of comity that compel defe-
rence and mutual respect for concurrent proceedings.
Thus, the better rule is that duplication of parties
and issues alone is not sufficient to justify issuance
of an antisuit injunction.,,388
However, this principle of mutual respect on the other hand
"authorizes the domestic court to resist the attempts
of a foreign court to interfere with an in personam
action before the domestic court.,,389
Besides these counter antisuit injunctions (or paradoxically
called "defensive antisuit injunctions") to protect the fo-
rum's jurisdiction, the use of an anti suit injunction is
also considered proper "to prevent litigants' evasion of the
forum's important public policies.,,390 This was analogized
to the rule permitting nonrecognition of foreign judgments
contravening crucial public policies of the recognition
forum.391 Contrary to the English rule, an anti suit injunc-
tion does not issue in "single forum" cases, where there
would be no cause of action in a United States court.392
Applying these principles to the facts, Judge Wilkey con-
firmed the lower court's injunction enjoining the appellants
from taking part in the foreign action in order to permit
the united States claim to go forward free of foreign inter-
ference.393 The dissent of J. Starr seems more consequent.
He perceives the injunction to be "unduly sweeping in light
of considerations of comity,,394 and would, therefore, remand
the case for consideration of narrowing the order so as to
enjoin appellants
"only from seeking countersuit injunctive relief ...
thus allowing them to follow the example of Lufthansa
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and Swissair in bringing declaratory judgment ac-
tions.,,395
This arguably corresponds to J. wilkey's view, who just wan-
ted to protect the forum's jurisdiction, because the
"British and American actions are not parallel proceed-
ings in the sense the term is normally used ...•
Rather, the sole purpose of the English proceeding is
to terminate the American action.,,396
Given this reasoning, it would have been sufficient to adopt
J. Starr's proposal of a more narrow injunction.
Decisions after Laker appear to follow J. Wilkey's re-
strictive language and adhere to the concept that "[o]nly in
exceptional situations should a trial court issue an [an-
tisuit] injunction.,,397
4. Evaluation
Courts have always398 emphasized that their antisuit injunc-
tions are directed to the party concerned, not to the
foreign courts.399 That this argument is some sort of
"sophistry,,400 has been expressly admitted by some courts:
they recognized that, because injunctions bar a party from
taking procedural steps in the foreign forum, they "effec-
tively restrict the foreign court's ability to exercise ju-
risdiction.,,401 This kind of "interference" certainly is not
desirable, although it can hardly be called contrary to
(public) international law, given the continued state prac-
tice by common law jurisdictions. But it is agreed by most
courts and writers that antisuit injunctions are "exception-
al remedies inconsistent with the normal relations between
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states and between courts of friendly states.,,402 Apparently
keeping this in mind, courts do, in general, use caution in
issuing antisuit injunctions.
Is there really a need for antisuit injunctions? Most
of the job could be done by defensive institutions. Thus, it
is proposed that any issues of vexation or unconsciounabil-
ity and other challenges to the application of a state's law
to a transnational controversy should be raised in a motion
for forum non conveniens where the proceedings are taking
place.403 This is, of course, only possible where the
foreign court applies a forum non conveniens type doctrine
allowing the stay or dismissal of proceedings before it. If
this is the case, why should a domestic court preempt the
forum gQg conveniens decision of the foreign court? An ex-
tremely "intrusive" decision in this sense is Metall und
Rohstoff A.G. v. ACLI Metals (London) Ltd.,404 where the
English High Court issued an injunction to terminate the
American proceedings only a few days before the ruling of
the American judge on a forum gQg conveniens motion was ex-
pected.405 On the other hand, if the foreign court has al-
ready dismissed a forum non conveniens motion, it is hard to
see why the domestic court should overrule this decision.406
Arguably, the foreign court decision on this issue should be
entitled to ~ judicata effect, even if it is not literally
the same issue but just the other side of the coin. Also, if
both countries believe to be the appropriate forum, instead
of issuing antisuit injunctions it is still less intrusive
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to simply let both proceedings go on and seek a solution at
the recognition and enforcement stage, when one judgment can
be pled res judicata.407 If the foreign adjudication was
against domestic public policy, the domestic forum may re-
fuse recognition.408
Similarly, in a counter antisuit injunction situation,
the domestic forum may just refuse to recognize the foreign
injunction on public policy grounds.409 If the foreign court
is determined to exercise jurisdiction, a counter antisuit
injunction would anyway not be of great help, because the
foreign forum would not recognize the domestic injunction.
Thus, there only remains the "deterrent value of enforcement
in the domestic forum,,,410 which is limited to assets and
interests there. Instead of injunctions, this deterrence may
also be achieved through a suit for damages for breach of
contract411 or for malicious prosecution.412
Between countries which adhere to a strict rule of lis
pendens the problem of antisuit injunctions cannot arise.
For the dispute resolution would be allocated exclusively to
the forum first seized.413 This applies evidently to the
regime of the European convention,414 where moreover the
spirit of the Convention should exclude any power to order
antisuit injunctions in a cause within the scope of the Con-
vention.415
Thus, there remains not much room left for a justifica-
tion of antisuit injunctions. Unfortunately, it is to be
expected that the real tough conflicts rooting in a
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perceived exorbitant extraterritorial assertion of jurisdic-
tion (as between America and Britain) remain a terrain for
antisuit injunctions,416 unless there will be a resolution
of this issue by convention, which is not in sight. Thus,
one has to apply to the reason and "friendly common sense"
of nations. A very restrictive use of antisuit injunctions
will reduce frictions in a system of interdependent
sovereign states, and will prevent policy conflicts (which
necessarily exist in such a system) from "eroding the basis
of the international legal system.,,417
B. Anti Enforcement Injunctions
The injunctive power of American and English courts also
extends to restraining attempts to enforce in the forum
state or abroad a judgment obtained in foreign legal pro-
ceedings.418 The classic English case is Ellerman Lines,
Ltd. v. Read,419 where a party successfully undertook
fraudulent arrestment proceedings in Turkey the enforcement
of which was to be prohibited. Scrutton L.J. stated:
"I cannot conceive that if an English Court finds a
British subject taking proceedings in breach of his
contract in a foreign Court, supporting those proceed-
ings, and obtaining a judgment, by fraudulent lies, it
is powerless to interfere to restrain him from seeking
to enforce that judgment.,,420
The injunctive power to restrain foreign proceedings was
simply considered to comprise all kinds of proceedings, in-
cluding enforcement proceedings.421 Parallel to the
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situation of "normal" antisuit injunctions, the court em-
phasized that it does not seek "to assume jurisdiction over
the foreign court ... but has regard to the personal at-
titude of the person who has obtained the foreign judg-
ment.,,422
As concerns fraudulent foreign judgments, American
courts also appear to have equitable jurisdiction "to re-
strain proceedings on the judgment which cannot be conscien-
tiously enforced.,,423 Taking into account the rules on re-
cognition of foreign judgments one should consider that the
injunctive decree takes precedence over the prior judgment,
since in the event of inconsistent judgments or orders Uni-
ted States law applies the last-in-time rule.424
c. "Substantative Law Action" For an Order to Discontinue
Foreign Proceedings
This may be called a civilian law counterpart to the Anglo-
American anti suit injunction. Since civil law courts do not
have inherent equitable powers, the approach is strictly
substantive. It should be recalled that the House of Lords
came close to such a substantative approach in its Laker
decision, introducing the concept of a "right not to be sued
abroad. ,,425
One German case of 1938 is known, which has a rather
singular background. A German husband instituted divorce
proceedings against his German wife in a Latvian court, the
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then "divorce paradise." The German courts held this to be
tortious conduct "contra bonos mores," and entered judgment
against the husband on a tort theory. The damages, or com-
pensation respectively, which the husband had to "pay," were
held to be the husband's discontinuing the Litvian proceed-
ings.426 The judgment seemed to be limited to situations
where the "unconscionable" commencement of an action resul-
ted from a double domicile situation (the husband was domi-
ciled both in Germany and Litvia) leading to the application
of Litvian law under the Litvian conflict of laws rules con-
trary to German conflict of laws rules.427 This substanta-
tive approach is rarely to apply. Indeed, this is the only
case known in German law.428
D. Action for a Declaratory Judgment Denying or Reducing
the "Benefits" Awarded or to Be Awarded in the Foreign
Proceeding
The situation is as follows: Plaintiff commences an action
in one forum. Thereafter, defendant goes to another forum
and institutes an action there, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the claim asserted by the plaintiff in the first
action does not exist. Such a subsequent declaratory action
is not available in a forum which recognizes a foreign lis
pendens.429 If both proceedings are allowed to go on, the
resolution comes at the recognition and enforcement stage.
We can refer to our considerations on recognition, the
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"second lis pendens theory," and on conflicting judg-
ments.430
E. Evaluation
These comments can be kept brief, because the main consider-
ations have already been pointed out in section A above on
the evaluation of anti suit injunctions. The same considera-
tions similarly apply to aggressive institutions in general,
whereby the declaratory judgment category should not be re-
garded a real aggressive institution, since it does not
really interfere with the jurisdiction or proceedings of
foreign courts. It is just a source of potentially conflict-
ing judgments.
The effects of aggressive means are usually limited to
the issuing country because of the public policy reserva-
tions in the laws on recognition of foreign "judgments."
Aggressive means, as their name suggests, are not desirable
from an international point of view, because they interfere
with the activities of foreign courts. Although those means
do not appear to be contrary to international law, one
should always keep in mind that "overly aggressive adjudica-
tion can disrupt commerce and peace between nations much
more than it can between states.,,431
V. PRECAUTIONARY INSTITUTIONS
This chapter deals with forum selection and arbitration
clauses. By agreeing upon a certain forum or arbitral tribu-
nal parties can take precautions against disputes over ju-
risdictional questions and jurisdictional conflicts. Nations
which recognize such agreements can avoid jurisdictional
conflicts where parties make use of such "precautionary in-
stitutions."
A. In General
Certainty432 and conflict avoidance make it desirable that
there be only one exclusive forum or tribunal designated to
deal with a certain matter. This designation can be made by
the parties, by including choice of forum or arbitration
clauses in their contract. Some have called this "preventive
forum shopping,,,433 and it indeed prevents conflicts which
may arise between the parties (and possibly between states)
if there is more than one forum available. Of course, this
works only if such clauses are honored by the courts or laws
in the different countries. As concerns the forum proroga-
turn,that is the chosen forum, this means that such a clause
should cut off a jurisdictional or forum non conveniens
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defense there.434 As concerns the forum derogatum, that is
the non-chosen forum, any proceedings instituted there
should be dismissed or stayed.
States are not obliged under international law to ac-
cept any prorogation or derogation.435 Nevertheless, there
is a growing trend towards accepting and already a "fairly
wide acceptance of the effectiveness of such agreements sub-
ject, of course, to certain qualifications. ,,436
B. Recognition of Choice of Forum Clauses
1. United States
The traditional common law rule did not give effect to the
parties' choice of forum, because such agreements were per-
ceived to "oust" otherwise competent courts of jurisdiction
and thus violate public policy.437 The newly emerging con-
sensus of United States courts438 was expressed by the
Supreme Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore co.,439
where the court found that the
"elimination of all ... uncertainties by agreeing in
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an
indispensable element in international trade, commerce,
and contracting.,,440
Noting that the
"expansion of American business and industry will hard-
ly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts,
we insist on a parochial concept that all dis~utes must
be resolved under our laws and in our courts" 41
the court adopted a "more hospitable attitude toward forum-
selection clauses" and held
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"that such clauses are prima facie valid and should be
enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances.,,~42
Circumstances rendering enforcement unreasonable are "fraud,
undue influence, or overweening bargaining power,,,443 which
make the agreement a non-freely negotiated one, and enforce-
ment may not "contravene a strong public policy of the
forum.,,444 In the case before it, the court remanded for
consideration of potential unreasonableness (as to which the
burden of showing is cast on the contestant), before the
action instituted in federal court in Florida contrary to a
clause referring all disputes to the United Kingdom, would
be dismissed. The exclusiveness of the choice is determined
by interpreting the language of the clause,445 and thus it
is desirable to state that the choice of forum is ex-
clusive.446 In recent years, United States courts have rare-
ly taken jurisdiction over cases in which the parties had
chosen a different forum; they have generally enforced the
choice of forum clause.447 As to the jurisdiction conferring
function of such a clause, it should be noted that since
1984 New York's forum non conveniens rule, N.Y. Civ. Prac.
L. & R. § 327 (b),448 will sustain jurisdiction based on a
forum selection clause in a "big commercial contract" (for
at least $ 250,000 consideration) if the controversy is for
more than $ 1 million, irrespective of any connection of the
transaction to New York.449
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2. European Convention
Art. 17 of the convention450 provides that451 a choice of
forum clause, if at least one of the parties is domiciled in
a member state, renders the chosen forum the exclusive
forum.452 An interesting aspect is added by Art. 17 (3): if
the agreement is concluded for the benefit of only one of
the parties, this party has the right to bring the case be-
fore any other court which has jurisdiction under the Con-
vention. As the European Court has recently clarified, this
may only be assumed if it is clearly shown that both parties
wanted the agreement to benefit one party (not just that one
party is benefitted by choosing his home forum), because
Art. 17 purports to respect the intentions of the par-
ties.453
3. England
English courts have sustained jurisdiction if they were se-
lected by the parties even if the transaction had few or no
connection with England.454 On the other hand, an action
brought before an English court contrary to an exclusive
forum selection clause is likely to be stayed and not dis-
missed.455 This is a discretionary decision where the courts
take into account considerations similar to those in a forum
non conveniens decision,456 such as the relative convenience
and expenses of trial in the foreign country and England,
the parties' contacts with the respective countries, and
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whether "the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to
sue in the foreign court ,,457
4. France
French law accepts forum selection clauses to exclude local
jurisdiction. Such a clause is perceived to be a waiver of
French jurisdiction, respected even as to Art. 15 code civil
jurisdiction. 458
5. Federal Republic of Germany
Under German law it is well established that, in the realm
of the law of property and the law of obligations,459 ex-
clusive forum selection clauses in international contracts
are to be respected.460 "Businessmen parties" can validly
choose a forum according to § 38 (1) ZPo. Other parties can
validly agree on a forum pursuant to § 38 (2) ZPO, if at
least one of the parties is not domiciled in Germany and the
agreement is in writing or confirmed by writing.461 An
exception is made for agreements in conflict with rules on
exclusive jurisdiction under German law.462 It is worth no-
ting that for suits against the party whose home forum has
been chosen in the clause, this choice is assumed to be ex-
clusive.463 If the defendant invokes a forum selection
clause as defense to an action brought contrary to it, he
must do so before pleading on the merits because otherwise
he is taken to have consented to suit there.464
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6. Evaluation
Almost all Common Law jurisdictions and most Western Euro-
pean states with civilian legal systems respect forum selec-
tion clauses.465 However, since not all countries honor the
clauses, a situation may arise where the forum derogatum
does not recognize the clause but the forum prorogatum does,
as in a recent case before the Netherland Hoge Raad.466 One
party had instituted attachment proceedings as to a ship in
Bahrain contrary to a clause exclusively selecting Nether-
land courts. Bahrain allowed the proceedings. The Hoge Raad
entered judgment against the "faulty" party and ordered that
it procure the release of the ship in Bahrain. Moreover, the
English courts have issued anti suit injunctions where the
commencement of foreign proceedings, contrary to forum se-
lection clauses, was perceived to be oppressive or vexatious
(which is quite likely to be found so as to restrain a
breach of contract467).468 Since such measures, attempting
to enforce forum selection clauses, do or might interfere
with the jurisdiction of the foreign court, the considera-
tions developed as to aggressive institutions apply, and
care should be employed.469 A less intrusive way to deal
with such conflicts in connection with choice of forum clau-
ses ("connected" conflicts), is to indirectly enforce an
exclusive choice of forum clause by refusing to recognize
foreign judgments rendered in disregard of such a clause.470
There is also another "remedy" not interfering with foreign
court proceedings: If the foreign proceedings instituted
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contrary to a forum selection clause have led to pecuniary
loss (for example, resulting from a sequestration order in a
foreign court), it would appear to be possible to recover in
an action for breach of contract.471
C. Recognition of Arbitration Clauses
1. In General
Because "a foreign party will tend to view another nation's
judicial system as inherently untrustworthy,,,472 and if they
could not agree on a supposedly neutral third country forum,
parties may agree to private arbitration instead. Parties
often perceive an arbitral tribunal to be more impartial and
to have greater expertise in certain commercial matters.473
Another reason for choosing arbitration is that to some ex-
tent the preferences of the parties as concerns procedures
and laws to be applied may be included in an arbitration
clause, and that the proceedings are concluded in private,
thus protecting commercial interests.474 Like choice of
forum clauses, arbitration clauses also allocate the dispute
resolution to one exclusive forum.
2. Acceptance
Countries which respect choice of forum clauses generally
also accept arbitration clauses. The close relationship bet-
ween these two institutions, resulting in equal or similar
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treatment, was ably expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Scherk v. Alberto Culver co.:475
"An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal
is, in effect, a special kind of forum-selection clause
The invalidation of such an agreement ... would not
only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn pro-
mise but would, as well, reflect a 'parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and
in our courts. ,,,476
The court again emphasized the importance of certainty in an
international setting, because a refusal to enforce a "truly
international,,477 arbitration agreement "would invite un-
seemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to
secure tactical litigation advantages.,,478
The courts' traditional hostility towards arbitration
agreements, which were perceived to unduly displace their
jurisdiction,479 was overcome with the 1925 Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.480 The policy of favoring arbitration was reap-
proved and extended in 1970 when the United States became a
party to the 1958 united Nations convention.481 Art. II of
the Convention deals with the recognition of arbitration
agreements as follows:
1. Each contracting State shall recognise an agreement
in writing under which the parties undertake to submit
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen
or which may arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, con-
cerning a subject matter capable of settlement by ar-
bitration.
3. The court of a contracting State, when seised of an
action in a matter in respect of which the parties have
made an agreement within the meaning of this Article,
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the
parties to arbitration, unless it finds the said agree-
ment is null and void, or incapable of being performed.
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This has been implemented by chapter 2 of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act.482 The Act did not explicitly impose any sub-
ject matter restrictions; and consequently the question
arises as to the circumstances in which public policy ren-
ders a matter non-arbitrable.483 The arbitrability of a
claim under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act arising under
an international contract with an arbitration clause was at
issue in Scherk. Although its prior decision in Wilko v.
swan484 prohibited the arbitration of a 1933 Securities Act
claim arising under a domestic contract, the Supreme Court
enforced the international arbitration clause. The same no-
tion that "domestic policy concerns may become moot in an
international context,,485 became important in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc ..486 This deci-
sion held that even antitrust claims under the Sherman Act
are arbitrable under an arbitration clause in an interna-
tional commercial transaction. Considering the relative im-
portance of antitrust laws within the framework of United
States commercial policy, the Supreme Court might have gone
too far, as was alleged by some writers.487 From a stand-
point of conflict avoidance between nations it can only be
welcomed, because the area of public laws, or non-purely
civil matters which have regulatory aspects, is the very
area where conflicts are more likely to arise,488 and the
allocation of the dispute to one tribunal eliminates this
danger. In any case, the Supreme Court decision is further
evidence for the pro-arbitration attitude in the United
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States.489 As of 1986, arbitration statutes based on either
the Federal Arbitration Act or the Uniform Arbitration Act,
had been adopted by forty-three states.490 Most recently
Georgia passed an Arbitration Act, which incorporates quite
progressive rules as concerns international arbitration.491
Enforcement of the arbitration agreement means the fol-
lowing: When a party brings an action in a United States
court, the court has power to stay this action (pending the
completion of arbitration) if the dispute is within the
scope of the (valid) arbitration clause.492 In this instance
a United States court usually additionally issues an order
compelling arbitration (unless the adverse party voluntarily
proceeds to arbitration),493 which constitutes the remedy of
specific performance.494
The trend towards respecting arbitration clauses is not
limited to the United States. As already indicated in the
beginning of this chapter, countries which accept exclusive
forum selection clauses will generally also respect arbitra-
tion agreements.495 In England, arbitration agreements are
given similar deference as choice of forum clauses.496 In
France, the reform by way of the Decree of May 14, 1980497
clarified the law, and requires courts to decline jurisdic-
tion contrary to an arbitration agreement that is not "mani-
festly nUll.,,498 It also conferred the so-called "kompetenz-
kompetenz," that is the power to pass upon its own jurisdic-
tion and the validity of the contract, on the arbitral
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tribunal, as is the rule in Germany499 and similar in the
United States.500
Some speak already of a trend towards a "worldwide sys-
tem of dispute resolution.,,501 The united Nations Convention
has been acceded to by some seventy nations, including the
main trading countries.502 Another important step was the
adoption of the UNCITRAL model law on arbitration in 1985,
which is intended to make international practice more uni-
form.503 It is to be hoped that these efforts of achieving
widespread recognition of arbitration clauses at somewhat
uniform terms will be honored by the international communi-
ty.504
3. Evaluation
The importance of arbitration clauses in international sett-
ings should have become clear. Widespread acceptance and
recognition of such agreements will most likely avoid con-
flicts of jurisdiction, because the resolution of disputes
is allocated to one exclusive tribunal. Yet, because not all
states recognize arbitration clauses, in general or under
certain circumstances, there are situations where conflicts
may arise.
For instance, on the one hand, a party might oppose ar-
bitration (for example because the agreement is allegedly
invalid or the dispute not arbitrable) and try to get a
court order staying the arbitration.505 Or, on the other
hand, the arbitral tribunal might be asked for an order that
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the other party withdraw an action instituted before a na-
tional court, or at least obtain a stay of a hearing that is
part of the action in the national court.50G
Besides those conflicts between arbitral tribunals and
national courts, we can also imagine conflicts between
courts of different nations to occur in connection with ar-
bitration clauses ("connected" conflicts). This can happen
where a party commences a suit in a country which does not
respect the arbitration clause. The opposing party might try
to get help from a court of another state that does recog-
nize the arbitration clause. Similar considerations apply as
have been developed with regard to measures attempting to
enforce choice of forum clauses.507 English courts, for in-
stance, may issue prohibitive injunctions restraining
foreign court proceedings instituted contrary to contractual
clauses, not only for the protection of English courts se-
lected in a choice of forum clause,508 but also for the pro-
tection of arbitral tribunals selected in an arbitration
clause.509 This aggressive510 mean of restraining foreign
proceedings in order to enforce an arbitration clause should
only be employed in exceptional circumstances because of the
interference with foreign courts' activities.511 Correspond-
ing to the considerations as regards the enforcement of
choice of forum clauses,512 it appears preferable to only
indirectly enforce an arbitration clause by not recognizing
foreign orders and judgments rendered in disregard of the
clause. Also, it would appear that a court recognizing an
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arbitration clause could grant recovery in an action for
breach of contract, if the foreign proceedings instituted
contrary to the clause had led to pecuniary loss (for in-
stance resulting from a sequestration order in the foreign
court).513
It remains to be repeated, that the recognition of ar-
bitration agreements is highly desirable so as to avoid po-
tential conflicts by allocating the dispute to one exclusive
"forum." Connected conflicts will disappear as more nations
recognize arbitration clauses.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A scholar has said,
"[i]f one law suit is bad, two are worse."S14
This is not necessarily true for all cases, but conflicts
are likely to arise when two, or more, proceedings in the
same matter are allowed to go on. These conflicts may affect
the private parties only, who do not wish to end up with
conflicting judgments, but also the states concerned, since
conflicting state interests and policies may govern the dif-
ferent proceedings.
Public international law allows concurrent or multiple
jurisdiction among states, but sets limits to the exercise
of concurrent jurisdiction. These requirements, whose pur-
poses are to balance the state interests involved and to pay
due respect to foreign states interests, become less and
less precise the more we enter the field of purely civil
matters, where state interests disappear.
A variety of institutions of national laws deals with
the setting of concurrent jurisdiciton, and for the most
part these institutions try to avoid conflicts and the emer-
gence of conflicting judgments.
Some approaches want to avoid conflicts from the begin-
ning on by restraining the proceedings in one country. The
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doctrine of forum non conveniens stops the domestic proceed-
ings, if the other (or another) concurrent forum seems to be
the more appropriate forum to deal with the dispute at
issue.515 This is a discretionary decision giving a court
the opportunity to "fashion wise decisions on the exercise
of jurisdiction.,,516 In a similar defensive way, the doc-
trine of lis pendens does not allow domestic proceedings in
a dispute when the same dispute is already pending in the
court of another country. This approach to a great part
operates on the basis that the expected foreign judgment
would be recognized by the domestic forum. In this case the
commencement of duplicate domestic proceedings would be a
waste of judicial resources, since the eventual foreign
judgment could be pled res judicata in the domestic ac-
tion.51? Some systems apply a discretionary rule of lis pen-
dens,518 some systems a strict non-discretionary one.519 If
one action is already completed and has evolved into a judg-
ment in one country, the doctrine of res judicata and recog-
nition of foreign judgments will bar a new second suit in
the same matter.520
A more aggressive way to avoid duplicative proceedings
in the beginning is the issuance of injunctions restraining
a party from pursuing foreign proceedings.521 However, as is
recognized by courts, such injunctions should be issued with
care and in exceptional circumstances only, because they
interfere with the activities of foreign courts.522 From an
international point of view one should rather restrain the
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domestic proceedings than restrain the proceedings of a
foreign court.
If both proceedings are allowed to go on, the resolu-
tion comes at the recognition and enforcement stage. One
waits until judgment is rendered by one of the courts. If
the requirements for recognition of foreign judgments are
met,523 the other court will stop its proceedings, where the
foreign judgment may be pled res judicata. The so-called
"second lis pendens theory" poses the question whether the
pendency of a domestic action in the same dispute will bar
the recognition of the foreign judgment. Indeed, some coun-
tries employ a policy which gives preference to the domestic
action and bars recognition of the foreign judgment.524 The
more reasonable approach, which is consistent if one accepts
the institution of lis pendens, lets the action first in-
itiated prevail: The domestic action will bar recognition of
the foreign judgment only if the domestic action was first
instituted. 525
Not all countries employ the same rules to avoid dupli-
cate proceedings, and if rules on recognition do not stop a
second suit in the same matter, conflicting judgments might
emerge. When it comes to recognition and enforcement in a
situation of inconsistent judgments, some systems generally
give preference to their own forum judgment.526 If two
foreign judgments compete for recognition, according to one
view the first-in-time judgment should be recognized,527
whereas another view gives preference to the judgment
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last-in-time.528 Whatever rule is adopted, it should equally
apply to foreign and domestic judgments, and not generally
prefer domestic judgments. The United States applies its
last-in-time rule "non-discriminatorily.,,529
Parties can contribute to avoiding conflicts by agre-
eing on choice of forum or arbitration clauses. By their
allocating the dispute resolution to one exclusive "forum"
they take precautions against jurisdictional disputes and
conflicts from the beginning on. Courts in countries which
respect these "precautionary" clauses will assume or reject
jurisdiction according to whether they are the selected or
the derogated forum, respectively. Since not all countries
honor forum selection and arbitration clauses, conflicts may
arise where one country does not respect a clause, and the
other does respect it and employs measures to enforce the
clause ("connected" conflicts).530 For instance, the "en-
forcing court" might issue an injunction enjoining a party
from pursuing foreign proceedings contrary to a forum selec-
tion or arbitration clause. Still, conflicts are less likely
to occur with such clause than in a situation without them.
Such connected conflicts will disappear as more and more
nations recognize choice of forum and arbitration clauses.
After all, there are quite some institutions of nation-
al laws which try to avoid duplicate proceedings and the
emergence of conflicting judgments. Thus, despite a setting
of international concurrent jurisdiction, conflicts between
different jurisdicitions do not necessarily have to occur.
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The various institutions of national laws can be applied in
a manner taking due regard to friendly relations between
interdependent sovereign states preserving the "basis of the
international legal system."S31
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aspects (including the practice of States, the principles of
non-interference and reciprocity and the demands of inter-
dependence). A merely political, economic, commercial or
social interest does not in itself constitute a sufficient
connection."
50. "Sinnvolle Anknlipfung", MEESSEN, supra note 45, at 101;
B. GRO~FELD, INTERNATIONALES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT: DAS OR-
GANISATIONSRECHT TRANSNATIONALER UNTERNEHMEN 13 et seq.
(1986); VERDROSS/SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT 571 (1976);
"sinnvoller Anknlipfungspunkt", G. DAHM, 1 VOLKERRECHT 256
(1958).
51. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 291, 302. The RESTATEMENT
(REVISED), supra note 31, § 403 adopted a principle of
reasonableness, which leads to similar results. But sys-
tematically this concept has to be placed to the limits on
the exercise of jurisdiction when a bases exists. The same
reservation might be true as to Mann's theory, the sys-
tematic place of which is not totally clear, see below at
note 101. Meessen's meaningful connection, however, belongs
clearly to the question of bases of jurisdiction, see Mees-
sen supra note 13, at 801.
52. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J.
4, 24, 26.
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53. Id. at 20 ("... it must be determined whether that
unilateral act by Liechtenstein [i.e. granting nationality}
is one which can be relied upon against Guatemala in regard
to the exercise of [diplomatic} protection.")
54. Cf. MEESSEN, supra note 45, at 103.
55. Cf. Mann, supra note 18, at 29; NEREP, supra note 15, at
462.
56. See Meessen, supra note 13, at 800.
57. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 31, § 401, 402.
58. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 31, § 421.
59. Mann, supra note 18, at 67.
60. Cf. MANN, supra note 21, at 128-29: "The mere fact that
a State's judicial ... agencies are internationally entitled
to subject a person to their personal or 'curial' jurisdic-
tion, does not by any means permit them to regulate by their
orders such person-s conduct abroad. This they may do only
-if the State of the forum also has substantive jurisdiction
to regulate conduct "
61. Id. at 129.
62. Cf. NEREP, supra note 15, at 461-62. See also MANN,
supra note 21, at 61: "A judgment, viz. a command conveyed
through the courts, is not essentially different from a com-
mand expressed by legislative or administrative action. It
cannot claim validity except if and in so far as it keeps
within the limits which public international law imposes."
63. Mann, supra note 18, at 67.
64. Courts do not only render judgments but also enforcement
orders, such as service of writs, production of witnesses
and documents. This lead some authors to the creation of a
category of "jurisdiction to enforce." The terminology is
not quite clear, since some authors include all acts of
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courts in this category (e.g. Bowett, supra note 34, at 555;
the older view of MANN, supra note 21), others do not (e.g.
the newer view of Mann, supra note 18, the RESTATEMENT
(REVISED), supra note 31, S 421, 431.) In our context this
is only a marginal problem, since we are concerned with the
assumption of jurisdiction to render judgments in possibly
parallel proceedings. Anyway, jurisdiction to enforce can
only be exercised if the state also has legislative juris-
diction (e.g. Bowett id.). This has lead one author to con-
sider the distinction to be of "no legal moment" (NEREP,
supra note 15, at 461, the only relevant distinction being
between jurisdiction physically exercised in the territory
of another state, and jurisdiction exercised within the ter-
ritory of the exercising state.)
65. Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 1972-73
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 145, 187. Similarly Schlochauer cited by
NEREP, supra note 15, at 483 (as regards civil laws states
are free in principle to exercise jurisdiction); also care-
fully HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER, SMIT, supra note 23, at 822,
883.
66. Cf. Akehurst, supra note 65, at 187; HENKIN, PUGH,
SCHACHTER, SMIT, supra note 23, at 821-22; Bowett, supra
note 34, at 557 (as to Akehurst's view).
67. Mann, supra note 18, at 21; also RESTATEMENT (REVISED),
supra note 31, S"403 comment f ("... apply to criminal as
well as to civil law") and S 421 comment b ("criminal as
well as civil jurisdiction").
68. See supra at note 17.
69. Bowett, supra note 34, at 557.
70. Id.; this is probably also the real meaning of Ake-
hurst's view when he speaks of "private law", supra at note
65.
71. Nagel, Die Begrenzung des internationalen Zivilproze~-
rechts durch das Volkerrecht, 75 Zeitschrift fUr Zivilproze~
408, 420, 421 (1962): "... volkerrechtsgema~ ist, wenn immer
eine Beziehung des Auslanders zu dem Territorium des Ge-
richtsstaates besteht ....die Zustandigkeit eines Staates
nicht gegeben ist, wenn er weder direkt noch indirekt irgen-
deine Beziehung zu Auslandern hat."(emphasis added.)
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Probably similar to the here proposed approach NEREP, supra
note 15, at 501: "It is a rather significant feature of all
Conflict of Law cases that the jurisdiction exercised by one
state more or less affects other states as well as the in-
dividuals. The difference in this respect between civil law
jurisdiction and criminal jurisdiction is one of degree
only. "
72. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 u.S. 310
(1945). More recently e.g. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 u.S. 286 (1980).
73. E.g. In re Marc Rich & Co. AG v. United States, 707 F.2d
663 (2d Cir. 1983) (sufficient that foreign company had vio-
lated a substantial interest of the U.S., namely "injurious-
ly affected .•. its revenue laws," at 667). Also, the con-
cept of "doing business" within the U.S. has sometimes been
interpreted quite broadly: Neimann v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
Ltd., 619 F.2d 1189, 1193 (1980) held a "defendant's par-
ticipation in the state in substantial preliminary negotia-
tions leading to the contract in issue" to constitute suffi-
cient contacts.
74. It shall protect the defendant against the burden of
litigating in an inconvenient forum (due process), and en-
sure that the states do not reach out beyond the limits im-
posed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system (federalism); see World-Wide Volkswagen,
supra note 72, at 291-92.
75. And therefore not necessarily coming up to the level of
international law demands, cf. Mann, supra note 18 , at 72.
76. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408 (1984), which made nothing of the fact that the
relevant events and parties occured outside the U.S.; see L.
BRILMAYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 290-92 (1986).
77. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Califor-
nia, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (1987). 4 justices held against 4 jus-
tices that as to foreign defendants it is not enough to show
that goods were placed into the stream of commerce in a
foreign country knowing that the goods would be sold to the
American market. They required that it be shown that the
foreign defendant intended to target the American market.
The matter was dealt with as a question of constitutional
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due process requirements, which might be different as con-
cerns foreign defendants. For a different due process stan-
dard in international cases also Born, Reflections on Judi-
cial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 Ga. J. Int-l &
Compo L. 1, 28 et seq., esp. 34 (1987): "... in internation-
al cases ... the Due Process Clause ... should require
closer connections between the forum and the defendant than
are necessary in domestic cases."
78. GRO~FELD, supra note 50, at 140-41 ("beunruhigend
'zupackend''').
79. Esp. abroad. Most sharply see Mann, supra note 18, at
72, 95 (the u.s. "has gone astray").
80. See supra at note 72. Mere presence may be a sufficient
minimum contact. Thus, the minimum contacts doctrine in the
u.s. did not necessarily abolish transient jurisdiction, but
it is argued that it should at least do so in international
cases, see Born, supra note 77, at 35-36. One limit under
International Shoe is that isolated contacts which are unre-
lated to the cause of action would not be sufficient, 326
u.S. at 319. See NANDA/PANSIUS, supra note 17, at 1-8 et
seq ..
81. Mann, supra note 18, at 70. Not too long ago the Court
of Appeals appeared more restrictive and held that "there
was no basis in law for the proposition that where a defen-
dant was served with proceedings when on a short visit to
England the presumption arose that the proceedings were op-
pressive", H.R.H. Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of Baroda v.
Wildenstein, [1972] 2 Q.B. 283, 284. Within the realm of the
European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters this practice is
abolished, see infra at note 90.
82. See Mann id.
83. Art. 14 Code Civil reads in part that "l'etranger ...
pourra etre traduit devant les tribunaux de France pour les
obligations par lui contractees en pays etranger envers les
Francais"; for a translation see H. STEINER/D. VAGTS, TRANS-
NATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 45 (1986). See generally de Vries/-
Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions - A Comparison
of Civil Law Views, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 306, 317 et seq. (1959).
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84. de Vries/Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 317.
85. See ide at 320-21; also STEINER/VAGTS, supra note 83, at
45.
86. Cf. sharply MANN, supra note 21, at 67: "it far exceeds
the recognized limits of jurisdiction: it is impossible to
think of a single argument in favour of the proposition that
a State has jurisdiction over the whole world merely because
it has entered into a contract with one of such State's na-
tionals." Already in 1887 it was critizised in France by CH.
DAGUIN, DE L'AUTORITE ET DE L'EXECUTION DES JUGEMENTS
ETRANGERS EN MATIERE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 117 (1887):
"L'art. 14 ••. est •.. contraire aux vrais principes du
droit des gens modernes, qui tendent a l'extension des bons
rapports de peuple a peuple."(also cited in Nagel, supra
note 71, at 420.)
87. De Winter, Excessive Jurisdiction in Private Interna-
tional Law, 17 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 706, 707 (1968); de Vries-
/Lowenfeld, supra note 83, at 332. See also GRO~FELD, supra
note 50, at 136-37; STEINER/ VAGTS, supra note 83, at 48.
88. E.g. J. SCHRODER, INTERNATIONALE ZUSTANDIGKEIT 375
(1971) ("eine der schlimmsten Fehlleistungen, die im zwis-
chenstaatlichen Verkehr liberhaupt vorstellbar sind.");
Nagel, supra note 71, at 420 ("vom internationalen Gesichts-
punkt unglinstigen deutschen Beispiel"); even the Federal
Supreme Court called the provision "internationally un-
desirable" ("im internationalen Rechtsverkehr unerwlinscht",
BGHZ 52, 251, 256 (1969»; see also STEINER/VAGTS, supra
note 83, at 48; Mann, supra note 18, at 69 labeled it "an
exorbitant jurisdiction in the most literal sense of the
term. "It should be noted, however, that recent decisions try to
interprete § 23 restrictively. Thus, the Circuit Court of
Appeals (Frankfurt) held that § 23 does not apply when en-
forcement measures as to the appertaining property are im-
possible, OLG Frankfurt, in 1982 Recht der internationalen
Wirtschaft 439, 440.
89. See supra at notes 70, 71; and Nagel, supra note 71, a
421 ("Damit versto~en solche Vorschriften aber noch nicht
gegen eine allgemeine Regel des Volkerrechts. Es ist nicht
bekannt geworden, da~ Deutschland oder Frankreich hieraus
wegen eines Volkerrechtsversto~es belangt waren.") Also
Born, supra note 77, at 19: "... assertions of exorbitant
jurisdiction by national courts undercut suggestions that
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state practice clearly reflects a rule prohibiting such
claims."
90. 1968 European Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, as
amended 1978, 21 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 304/77-102),
reprinted in 18 Int'l Leg. Mat. 8 (1979).
91. See supra II.A.1.; although the Lotus case only dealt
with criminal jurisdiction, the notion of concurrent juris-
diction should a fortiori apply to civil jurisdiction.
92. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 31, § 402 comment
b; Bowett, supra note 34, at 565.
93. Id.; see also the example of Laker Airways v. Sabena,
731 F.2d 909, 922 (under international law, territoriality
and nationality often give rise to concurrent jurisdiction),
and at 926 (the sufficiency of jurisdictional contacts with
both the u.S. and England results in concurrent jurisdiction
to prescribe).
94. "any link", see supra at note 71.
95. Supra note 90.
96. All bases are founded on connecting factors of equal
value, see Kohler, Practical Experience of the Brussels Ju-
risdiction and Judgments Convention in the Six Original Con-
tracting States, 34 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 563, 573 (1985). The
recognition of concurrent jurisdiction also implicitly fol-
lows from Art. 21 of the Convention dealing with the effects
of foreign lis pendens (as to this institution see infra
III.B.).
97. Meessen, supra note 13, at 801 as regards antitrust
cases containing foreign elements. See similarly NEREP,
supra note 15, at 481: "Jurisdiction today is certainly not
exclusive, but very much concurrent." Also Bowett, supra
note 34, at 565 ("situations of concurrent jurisdiction are
normal enough"), Morrison, supra note 2, at 419 ("Clearly
the international legal order creates a possibility of com-
peting jurisdictions."), Nagel, supra note 71, at 410
("Verschiedene Staaten konnen also durch ihre Prozel3-
vorschriften fUr denselben Rechtsstreit unter denselben
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Personen ihre Gerichte fUr zustandig erklaren."), at 419
("gebietsbezogen .•. personalbezogen. Dadurch mUssen natUr-
lich tiberschneidungen in der Kompetenzverteilung der ver-
schiedenen Staaten auftreten.")
98. Sir G. Fitzmaurice in the Case concerning Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 105. His complete relevant dictum also reflects a
two-step approach (a) and (b):
"It is true that under present conditions international
law does not impose hard and fast rules on States deli-
miting spheres of national jurisdiction in such matters
[namely bankruptcy jurisdiction] (and there are of
course others - for instance in the fields of shipping,
"anti-trust" legislation, etc.) ..• It does however (a)
postulate the existence of limits - though in any given
case it may be for the tribunal to indicate what these
are for the purposes of that case; and (b) involve for
every state an obligation to exercise moderation and
restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed
by the courts in cases having a foreign element, and to
avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more proper-
ly appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable
by, another State."
99. NEREP, supra note 15, at 530; also at 562-63 ("Whether
there is a basis for jurisdiction is really of no sig-
nificance .•.. The only meaningful question, from the stand-
point of international law, is ... whether or not jurisdic-
tion is properly exercised.")
100. Cf. only NEREP, supra note 15, at 522 et seq. with
ample references. According to the abuse of rights theory,
states are generally free to assume jurisdiction in any
case. Only the abuse of this right to exercise juriadiction
is prohibited. The abuse of rights theory appears to be much
too permissive, since an abuse can be invoked in exceptional
circumstances only (at 527.)
101. Cf. Mann, supra note 18, at 28-29 ("arbitrariness is
essentially the same as unreasonableness"). See also text in
supra note 51.
102. Supra note 31, § 402 v. § 403.
103. Supra II.A.1.; Riedweg, discussion, 51 ILA 304, 306
(1964) spoke of putting "the cart before the horse." Of
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course, one should not overlook the interrelationship bet-
ween bases and exercise of jurisdiction in so far as a firm
practice of interest balancing (see infra II.E.2.) may lead
to new bases of jurisdiction, see MEESSEN, supra note 45, at
232, who adheres to a two-step analysis also in Meessen,
supra note 13, at 801. Also Bowett, supra note 34, at 572-
73: "So the question really becomes one of deciding whether,
assuming a valid basis for jurisdiction to exist, it would
be reasonable or proper for one state to exercise its juris-
diction in a particular way."
104. Bowett, supra note 34, at 565.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. As long as the international m1n1mum standard of rights
is not affected, which is not conceivable in normal proceed-
ings.
108. Besides Bowett, supra at note 34, cf. Meessen, supra
note 13, at 803.
109. Supra at note 29.
110. See supra at note 92-3.
111. GA Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970, reprinted in 65 AJIL 243
(1971) .
112. Id. at 248.
113. Bowett, supra note 34, at 566; MEESSEN, supra note 45,
at 200 et seq.
114. Bowett, supra note 34, at 568.
115. Id.; MEESSEN, supra note 45, at 403; cf. also NEREP,
supra note 15, at 558, 559, 563.
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116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (1965).
117. See supra at notes 107, 108; also MEESSEN, supra note
45, at 207.
118. Supra note 31.
119. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 31, § 403
reporters' note 6; and § 415 reporters' note 4 (the Timber-
lane and Mannington Mills [infra notes 122, 123J "approach
and method were those indicated in § 403 (2)").
120. Bowett, supra note 34, at 569.
121. Supra note 36.
122. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A.,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
123. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
124. Id. at 1297-98. Cf. similarly Timberlane, supra note
122, at 614.
125. Cf. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 31, § 403 (2).
See also supra note 118.
126. Timberlane, supra note 122, at 609 did even expressly
reject any influence of international law.
127. Id. at 612; Mannington Mills, supra note 123, at 1296.
128. Mann, supra note 18, at 31.
129. Id. at 87. The opposite view is well expressed by SIR
F. PIGOTT, FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND JURISDICTION, Part I 412
(1908): "the rules of comity are what the individual
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countries choose to make them," cited in Nagel, supra note
71, at 414.
130. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 31, § 403 comment a.
131. Morrison supra note 2, at 423, 429. See also the ex-
press intent of the reporters in RESTATEMENT (REVISED),
supra note 31, § 403 reporters' note 10: "In contrast to
prior § 40, reasonableness in all the relevant circumstances
is understood here not as a basis for requiring that states
consider moderating their enforcement of laws which they are
authorized to prescribe, but as an essential element in de-
termining whether, as a matter of international law, the
state has jurisdiction to prescribe."
Some criticize that the new approach would create "regula-
tory havens" for multinational corporations because a "nega-
tive competence conflict" becomes possible (Morrison ide at
431 et seq.): The judicial determination in country A that A
has no jurisdiction, would not assure that a court in coun-
try B would assume jurisdiction (Morrison ide at 431).
Therefore, some activity might remain unregulated, although
country A only declined to exercise jurisdiction because it
thought that country B would assume jurisdiction. However,
the phenomenon of "regulatory havens" should not give rise
to criticisms, since the non-exercise of (regulatory) juris-
diction may in itself be seen as a sovereign decision how to
exercise jurisdiction, which has to be respected (see the
Declaration on Principles, etc., supra at note 111, and Bow-
ett, supra note 34, at 568. Thus, the statement that an in-
ternational "laissez-faire" in cases of a negative com-
petence conflict is "ill-suited to modern conditions"(Mor-
rison, supra note 2, at 417), neglects the basic notions of
sovereign equality and non-interference).
132. Supra note 31.
133. Cf. Morrison, supra note 2, at 427.
134. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 31, § 403 (3) (em-
phasis added).
135. Mann, supra note 18, at 31.
136. Id. at 89: "asks with which country it has the closest
contact."
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137. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.Supp.
1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979): "Aside from the fact that the
judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority,
to evaluate the economic and social policies of a foreign
country, such a balancing test is inherently unworkable in
this case. The competing interests here display an irrecon-
cilable conflict on precisely the same plane of national
policy ... It is simply impossible to judicially 'balance'
these totally contradictory and mutually negating actions."
Also Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909, 948 et seq., esp. 950 (1984) referring to the
Uranium case.
138. Supra note 124.
139. See supra note 137.
140. Bowett, supra note 34, at 570.
141. Compare No.s 4 and 7 of the Mannington list, supra at
note 124.
142. See supra at notes 107, 108. One cannot assume that the
interests of a state's national reflect also the interests
of that state. Of course, private interests may be taken
into account supplementarily, but this is not required by
international law, and they can never outweigh the result of
a state interest analysis.
143. Meessen, supra note 13, at 802, with reference to the
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunesia/Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, as an example that under inter-
national law not every aspect of a case is relevant.
144. Cf. supra at notes 18, 111.
145. See supra at notes 116-117.
146. International Law Association, 55th Conference 1972,
Draft Resolution Art. 7, 1972 ILA XX.
147. OECD, Corom. on Int'l Investment and Multinat'l
Enterprises, The 1984 Review of 1976 OECD Declarations and
105
Decisions on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises, approved by the Council of Ministers, May 18,
1984, OECD Doc. Press/A(84) 28.
148. Similarly Morrison, supra note 2, who adheres to the
old Restatement (Second) standard. See also Meessen, supra
note 13, at 803 ("state practice suggests that there is an
international law obligation to pay respect to foreign state
interests," the degree or practical consequences of paying
respect are rather open, though; in the field of antitrust
law he proposes a balancing test, at 805.)
149. See supra at note 70.
150. Supra II.C .. The present stage in this field is quite
well expressed by Born, supra note 77, at 19-20: "The
proposition that international law presently imposes a
~reasonableness' requirement on the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction is arguably somewhat overstated .... develop-
ments testify to an emerging principle of international law
requiring assertions of judicial jurisdiction to be
reasonable." His "reasonableness" means our "paying respect
to foreign states interests", and his statement on "judicial
jurisdiction" arguably applies to our concept of purely
civil jurisdiction as well, although he probably only meant
to cover personal or "curial" jurisdiction (the distinctive
treatment of which does not really make sense from an inter-
national law point of view, cf. supra at notes 59-61).
151. Bowett, supra note 34, at 574.
152. Note, The Emerging Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: A
Comparison of the Scottish, English and United States Ap-
plications, 18 Vande J. Transnat'l L. 111, 112 (1985).
153. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
154. Id. at 508-09. Before this Supreme Court decision the
doctrine had already been applied by some state courts, see
e.g. ide at 509 as to New York law. As of 1971, twenty-two
states had expressly adopted the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, Berger, Zustandigkeit und Forum Non Conveniens im
Amerikanischen Zivilprozess, 41 RabelsZ 39, 68 (1977).
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155. See Note, supra note 152, at 138 with references to
cases in note 152.
156. 454 u.S. 235 (1981).
157. Id. at 255-56, 261 ("The District Court properly
decided that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's
forum choice applied with less than maximum force because
the real parties in interest are foreign.") This has lead
some commentators to say that the "presence of a few
American claimants may well tip the balance in favor of
retention of jurisdiction" (Tompkins, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens in the Litigation of Foreign Aviation Tort
Claims in the United States, 2 Notre Dame Int'l & Compo L.J.
19, 56 (1984». Others have more directly said that U.S
courts should "overcome their extreme reluctance to apply
the doctrine of forum non conveniens when the plaintiff is a
forum resident"(R.J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 150 § 4.10 (3rd ed. 1986», or spoke of "discrimina-
tion against foreign citizens"(Stein, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. Pa. L.R.
781, 836 (1985».
158. Stein, supra note 157, at 842. The international con-
cerns are well expressed in Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories,
510 F.Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 685
(3d Cir. 1982): "... these cases would be more conveniently
and appropriately heard in the courts of the United
Kingdom ..•• Each country has its own legitimate concerns
.•.• The United States should not impose its own view of the
safety, warning, and duty of care required of drugs sold in
the United States upon a foreign country when those same
drugs are sold in that country." That the applicable law
would anyway be the law of the U.K.(id. at 5) is not neces-
sarily decisive since "[t]he question is not simply what law
to apply, but also who ought properly to apply it"(Stein,
supra note 157, at 842.) See similarly In re Union Carbide
Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F.Supp. 842, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1986): "This Court ••• thinks that it should avoid
imposing characteristically American values on Indian con-
cerns. The Indian interest in creating standards of care ...
is significantly stronger than the local interest in deterr-
ing multinationals from exporting allegedly dangerous tech-
nology," or at 867: "...to retain the litigation in this
forum .•. would be yet another example of imperialism,
another situation in which an established sovereign in-
flicted its rules, its standards and values on a developing
nation." It is to be hoped that these considerations would
also apply as to an American plaintiff, and not only in
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favor of an American defendant. As to some doubts about that
see supra note 157.
159. 454 u.s. 235, 254 ("Of course, if the remedy provided
by the alternative forum is so clearly inadaequate or un-
satisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable
change in law may be given substantial weight ...").
160. See supra note 157.
161. WEINTRAUB, supra note 157, at 214 § 4.33.
162. at note 159.
163. Supra note 158.
164. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d
195 (2nd Cir. 1987), US cert. den. in 108 S.Ct. 199. The
Court of Appeals also upheld the condition that Union Car-
bide waive its defenses based on statute of limitations.
165. Leigh, Forum non conveniens - conditional dismissal of
tort claim by foreign plaintiff, 80 AJIL 964, 967 (1986);
Seward, After Bhopal: Implications for Parent Company
Liability, 21 Int'l Lawyer 695, 704 (esp. note 25)(1987).
166. Cf. supra note 13, and WEINTRAUB, supra note 157, at
215 § 4.33.
167. See only WEINTRAUB, supra note 157, at 215 § 4.33.
168. Supra note 90.
169. Kohler, supra note 96, at 571.
170. See Art. 4 (1) of the Convention, excepting certain ex-
clusive jurisdictions pursuant to Art. 16 of the Convention.
171. Lord Russell of Killowen, Mac Shannon v. Rockware Glass
Ltd., [1978] A.C. 795, 823 (H.L.(E.)).
108
172. Cf. St. Pierre v. Suoth American Stores (Gath and
Chaves) Ltd., [1936] 1 K.B. 382, 398.
173. [1974] A.C. 436 (H.L.).
174. Supra note 171.
175. rd. at 812.
176. See id. at 811 ("That would be to admit by the back
door a rule that your Lordships consider cannot be welcomed
at the front.")
177. [1984] 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.(E.)).
178. rd. at 411.
179. Carter, Jurisdiction to stay proceedings, 55 Brit. Y.B.
rnt'l L. 351, 355 (1984). See also Lord Reid in The Atlantic
Star, supra note 173, at 453 criticizing the "rather insular
doctrine" of Lord Denning: "... that seems to me to recall
the good old days, the passing of which many may regret,
when inhabitants of this island felt an innate superiority
over those unfortunate enough to belong to other races."
180. Lord Brandon in, The Abidin Daver, supra note 177, at
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parties, in the same or any other court •... The rule has
found its way into every system of jurisprudence, not only
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121
317. See id.; and ROMAN, supra note 303, at 27.
318. See supra III.B.
319. So a decision of the Bavarian Supreme Court, OLG
Mlinchen, judgment of April 2, 1964, in 1964 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 979, 980 (the nonrecognition of the domestic
lis pendens by the foreign forum violates domestic public
policy) .
320. See Palsson, supra note 208, at 82 with references.
321. See Palsson, supra note 208, at 107.
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action in another juridiction over the same matter, which
other action is still pending and undetermined, does not
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124
348. See further Martiny, supra note 307, at 743.
349. Juenger, supra note 324, at 25.
350. Juenger, supra note 324, at 26.
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364. Hartley, Comity and the Use of Antisuit Injunctions in
International Litigation, 35 Am. J. Compo L. 487, 491
(1987).
365. So the Privy Concil, infra note 370, at 73.
366. See Hartley, supra note 364, at 492, and Spiliada,
supra note 182.
367. Note, Antisuit Injunctions and International Comity, 71
Va. L. Rev. 1039, 1060 (1985).
368. Supra note 357.
369. Id. at 40.
370. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui
Jak , [1987] 3 W. L .R . 59.
371. Although Privy Council decisions are only persuasive
authority in England, the S.N.I.A.S. decision can be taken
as the statement of English law on the subject. This is sug-
gested by Lord Goff himself stating that in this area "no
material distinction is to be drawn between the law of
Brunei and the law of England" (id. at 70), and by "the air
of finality about the judgment," so Briggs, Restraint of
Foreign Proceedings, 1987 Lloyd's Marit. & Corom. L.Q. 391.
372. S.N.I.A.S., supra note 370, at 74 (emphasis added).
373. Briggs, supra note 371, at 395.
374. Except where the absence of a corresponding cause of
action is not reflecting regulatory policy, but is due to
oversight or lack of concern. Cf. Note, supra note 367, at
1061 at note 123.
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375. [1985] A.C. 58.
376. See Briggs, supra note 371, at 395.
377. See infra chapter V.
378. [1985] A.C. at 81. In the case at hand, the House of
Lords could not find a right not to be sued abroad,
wherefore it discharged the anti suit injunctions issued by
the Court of Appeals.
379. Briggs, supra note 371, at 395.
380. Hartley, supra note 364, at 496.
381. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C.Cir. 1984).
382. For a detailed outline of the Laker controversy, see
e.g. Hartley, supra note 364, at 587-89; and Schroder, The
Right not to be Sued Abroad, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR GERHARD
KEGEL (75. GEBURTSTAG) 523, 524-28 (ed. H.J. Musielak/K.
Schurig 1987).
383. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [1983] 3
W.L.R. 545 (C.A.). The court acted in large part in response
to British Government orders under the Protection of Trading
Interests Act, which prohibited the production of certain
documents and information in the U.S. action, making this
action untriable in the British court's view. The simul-
taneously instituted negative declaratory action (that Laker
had no antitrust claims against defendants) was finally dis-
posed of by declining jurisdiction to apply U.S. antitrust
laws.
384. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 559
F.Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Laker ..., supra
note 381.
385. Supra notes 383 and 375. The House of Lord did not find
Laker's conduct to be unconscionable, there were sufficient
contacts to the U.S. market. See [1985] A.C. at 86-87,
Schroder, supra note 382, at 542. The case lay different as
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concerned Laker's suit against the British bank Midland,
whose involvement at issue was restricted to British ter-
ritory, see Midland Bank v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1986] Q.B.
689 (C.A.).
386. Laker 731 F.2d at 927.
387. Please note the similarity to the English approach in
the Privy Council decision, supra note 370.
388. 731 F.2d at 928, rejecting more "liberal" case law
(cited in footnote 55).
389. Id. at 929.
390. Id. at 931. In the case at hand, "the district court's
injunction properly prevented appellants from attempting to
escape application of the antitrust laws to their conduct of
business here in the United States," ide at 932. Hartley,
supra note 364, at 496, identifies a third case, namely
where the forum court gives judgment before the foreign ac-
tion is commenced, but this does not seem quite clear, see
731 F.2d at 928.
391. Note, supra note 367, at 1053.
392. E.g. Stein Associates v. Heat and Control, Inc., 748
F.2d 653, 658 (Fed.Cir. 1984) (injunction only if "resolu-
tion of the domestic action will dispose of the foreign ac-
tion"); for further cases see Hartley, supra note 364, at
496 in note 43.
393. See 731 F.2d at 915, 916.
394. Id. at 957.
395. Id. at 958.
396. 731 F.2d at 930 (emphasis in the original).
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397. Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 308 (S.Ct.Tex. 1986).
The court evidently recalled the Laker litigation when ob-
serving that comity required restraint, because one of the
courts might respond to the issuance of an antisuit injunc-
tion by doing the same, thereby deadlocking the litigation,
see Leigh, Antisuit injunction-parallel litigation in u.s.
and Canadian courts-comity, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 967, 968
(1986).
See also the restrictive view in Kempe v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 1987 U.S.Dist. Lexis 3994 (E.D.Louis.,
judgment of May 14, 1987) ("Such an ephemeral threatened
injury could hardly outweigh the harm ... to the comity
which exists among courts of different nations which would
result from interference with the jurisdiction of a foreign
court"). Cf. also Black & Decker Corp. v. Sanyei America
Corp., 650 F.Supp. 406 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (at 408 referring to
the Laker view and the "more casual view of comity" sup-
posedly followed by the 7th circuit).
398. See e.g. Lord Portarlington, supra note 359, at 611;
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 u.S. 107, 121 (1890) (injunction "is
not directed to the courts of the other State, but simply to
the parties litigant"); Laker, 731 F.2d at 927.
399. That the latter would be clearly contrary to public
international law is beyond question. One state cannot order
another state (or its organs, such as courts) what to do.
"Par inter pares non habet jurisdictionern."
400. Hartley, supra note 364, at 506.
401. Laker, 731 F.2d at 927. See also the quote of Lord
Brandon, supra at note 369.
402. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403 Reporters' note 7 (1986).
403. See id.; Hartley, supra note 364, at 509; Schroder,
supra note 382, at 544; Note, supra note 367, at 1068.
404. [1984] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 598, 602.
405. See Hartley, supra note 364, at 507 at note 91.
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406. Id. at 507.
407. The principle of ending disputes does not go as far as
to allow a court to "terminate" the proceedings in a foreign
court.
408. See supra chapter III.C.; Note, supra note 367, at
1068.
409. See e.g. 42 Am.Jur.2d § 227 for the American rule that
"[n]either the full faith and credit clause nor rules of
comity require compulsory recognition of an injunction is-
sued in another jurisdiction against the prosecution of a
local action." This applies a fortiori as to foreign country
injunctions, as was rightly stated by Judge Wilkey, 731 F.2d
at 934, and 939. Generally see Schroder, supra note 382, at
547; too restrictive, because implicitly denying that the
injunction could be recognized, Siehr, supra note 5, at 137
("sicher ist, da~ es im Ausland keine Wirkungen entfaltet
und lediglich im Inland die betroffene partei sich einer
Ordnungsstrafe aussetzt").
410. Note, supra note 367, at 1069. Cf. also HENKIN/PUGH/
SCHACHTER/SMIT, supra note 23, at 880 commenting on this
"game of judicial daring": "the actual confrontation does
not occur until the court that issued the injunction imposes
some sanctions for its disobediance. Thus far, no court has
taken this ultimate step. It is generally recognized that
this type of confrontation is to be avoided as incompatible
with proper relations between members of the world com-
munity."
411. See infra chapter v. as to forum selection clauses and
suits for damages.
412. See Note, supra note 367, at 1069.
413. Cf. Schroder, supra note 382, at 544.
414. See supra III.B.2.b. and Art. 21 of the Convention.
415. Cf. Briggs, supra note 371, at 399.
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416. See Hartley, supra note 364, at 509-10.
417. Note, supra note 367, at 1070.
418. This goes also back to the conflict between Chancery
and common law; see HOLDSWORTH, supra note 358, at 459:
".•.restraining the parties from proceeding at law, or, if
they had already done so, from enforcing judgment."
419. [1928] 2 K.B. 144 (C.A.).
420. Id. at 152-53.
421. See ide at 152.
422. Atkin L.J. ide at 155.
423. J. N. POMEROY, 4 A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §
1364 (5th ed. 1941). See also the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 113, which denies enforcement of a
judgment if the holder of the judgment has been permanently
enjoined from enforcing the judgment.
424. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 423, § 113 comment
b. As to the last-in-time rule see supra chapter III.C.3.
425. See supra at notes 375 et seq ..
426. Reichsgericht, judgment of March 3, 1938, RGZ 157, 136,
esp. 140. The court referred to §§ 826, 249 BGB (the German
Civil Code).
427. See Wolff, case note, 66 Journal du Droit International
378, 380-81 (1939).
428. See Siehr, supra note 5, at 137. On the other hand,
Schroder, supra note 382, at 539 et seq. seems to take this
as an established institution, although he does not refer to
any other case.
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429. See supra III.B .. For a U.S. case in an interstate
setting see Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.,
342 U.S. 180 (1952) (patent owner started infringement suit
in Illinois; Delaware court stay of subsequent declaratory
judgment suit claiming that the patents were invalid was no
abuse of discretion); and for a federal - state court sett-
ing see Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S.
491 (1942) (at 495: "...claim[ed] that since another
proceeding was pending in a state court in which all the
matters in controversy between the parties could be fully
adjudicated, a declaratory judgment in the federal court was
unwarranted. The correctness of this claim was certainly
relevant in determining whether the District Court should
assume jurisdiction and proceed to determine the rights of
the parties. Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as
vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory
suit where another suit is pending in a state court present-
ing the same issues, not governed by federal law, between
the same parties. Gratuitous interference with the orderly
and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation
should be avoided."
See generally Siehr, supra note 5, at 137-38 (with reference
to Italian cases).
430. See supra chapter III.C.
431. BRILMAYER, supra note 76, at 289, referring to states
of a federal entity, esp. the U.S ..
432. See G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, LA CLAUSE D'ELECTION DE FOR
DANS LES CONTRATS INTERNATIONAUX 2 (1980): "[La clause]
ecarte l'incertitude planant sur la competence internation-
ale ..."
433. Siehr, supra note 5, at 138 ("praventives forum shopp-
ing").
434. In the context of arbitration this question does nor-
mally not arise.
435. Cf. Nagel, supra note 71, at 425, 430.
436. Pryles, Comparative Aspects of Prorogation and Arbitra-
tion Agreements, 25 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 543, 568 (1976). See
also Herold/Knoll, Negotiating and Drafting International
Distribution, Agency, and Representative Agreements: The
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United States Exporter's Perspective, 21 Int'l Lawyer 939,
948-949 (1987).
437. See e.g. Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254
F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.denied, 359 U.S. 180
(1959); Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the
United States, 13 Am.J.Comp.L. 187, 188 (1964); NANDA/PAN-
SIUS, supra note 17, at 7-4.
438. WEINTRAUB, supra note 157, at 223 § 4.35.
439. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
440. Id. at 13-14.
441. Id. at 9.
442. Id. at 10.
443. Id. at 12.
444. Id. at 15.
445. See, e.g. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611
P.2d 498, 504 (Alaska 1980).
446. Cf. Herold/Knoll, supra note 436, at 948.
447. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
supra note 31, at § 421, Reporters' note 5. For a long list
of cases declining jursdiction in obediance to forum-selec-
tion clauses, see WEINTRAUB, supra note 157, at 223 in note
29. In situations where the chosen forum had undergone a
revolution or other major political change courts have
refused to enforce choice of forum clauses on grounds that
no adaequate remedy would be available (Itek Corp. v. First
National Bank, 511 F.Supp. 1341 (D.Mass. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 704 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983) as to an Iranian
forum), or that it would be futile to bring a case in the
chosen (Iranian) forum (American Bell International v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 474 F.Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979», or
"because of changed circumstances in the forum state"
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(McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 591
F.Supp. 293, 308 (E.D.Mo. 1984)).
Federal courts have extended the Zapata ruling to non-ad-
miralty and domestic cases, see NANDA/PANSIUS, supra note
17, at 7-6 with references to case law. Nevertheless, some
courts still adhere to the traditional view (probably be-
cause they perceive the Zapata decision as being limited to
federal district courts sitting in admiralty, and to inter-
national situations), e.g. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster,
382 So.2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980)("We consider contract
provisions which attempt to limit the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state to be invalid and unenforceable as
being contrary to public policy"; however, this was an in-
terstate not an international situation), or, employing an
interesting approach, Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1980) (derogation
clause does not deprive Iowa court of jurisdiction but is
only one factor to be considered in a forum non conveniens
decision) .
448. In connection with General Obligations Law § 5-1402.
449. See Herold/Knoll, supra note 436, at 950 note 28.
450. Supra note 90.
451. Subject to certain formal limitations: generally the
agreement must be in writing or confirmed in writing.
452. Id., Art. 17 (1).
453. See Federal Supreme Court (F.R.G.), judgment of Sept.
18, 1986, in 1987 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3080, 3081;
and European Court of Justice, judgment of June 24, 1986,
[1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 333.
454. See the companion case to the u.S. Zapata case (supra
note 439), Unterweser Reederei GmbH v. Zapata Off-Shore Com-
pany, [1968] 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 158, 163 (Ct. App.): "... in
the absence of strong reason to the contrary ... [the
court's discretion] will be exercised in favour of holding
parties to their bargain."
455. See e.g. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse,
[1981] 3 AII.E.R. 520, concisely Lord Fraser at 525-26.
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456. See supra III.A.4.
457. "because they would: (i) be deprived of security for
their claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment ob-
tained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in
England; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or other
reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial," The Eleftheria,
[1970] P. 94, 100; as to a brief survey of other factors see
id., NANDA/PANSIUS, supra note 17, at 7-19-20 with referen-
ces, and Pryles , supra note 436, at 558 et seq •. See also
the Trendtex case in the prior note.
458. Pryles, supra note 436, at 568-69. Cf. also BATIF-
FOL/LAGARDE, supra note 234, at 425 et seq. § 687; D.F.
VAGTS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 189 (1986).
459. Dickson, supra note 235, at 244.
460. Martiny, supra note 307, at 737.
461. This is modeled after Art. 17 of the European Conven-
tion.
462. § 40 (2) ZPo. See generally as to the law on forum
selection clauses Martiny, supra note 307, at 737-38; ROSEN-
BERG/SCHWAB, supra note 235, at 95, 184 et seq ..
463. See OLG Mlinchen, judgment of March 31 1987, in 1987
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2166.
464. § 39 ZPo. See Pryles, supra note 436, at 569-70.
465. Herold/Knoll, supra note 436, at 949. See also NANDA/-
PANSIUS, supra note 17, at 7-20 with a short list.
466. Judgment of Febr. 1, 1985, N.J. 1985 No. 698. See
Schroder, supra note 382, at 528.
467. See Briggs, supra note 371, at 396.
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468. See The Tropaioforos (No.2), [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 410;
The Lisboa, [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 546.
469. Supra IV.A.4. and IV.E.
470. So the German approach, see Martiny, supra note 307, at
737; see also Juenger, supra note 324, at 19; the UFMJRA,
supra note 282, § 4(b)(5) provides for discretionary non-
recognition in such situations.
471. Compare as regards proceedings contrary to an arbitra-
tion clause the decision of the English Court of Appeal in
Mantovani v. Carapelli S.p.A., [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 375,
382 (quoted infra note 513); see also Briggs, supra note
371, at 397.
472. Feigenbaum, Development Bank of Philippines v. Chemtex
Fibers, Inc.: A Vote in Favor of International Comity and
Commercial Predictability, 21 Int'l Lawyer 873 (1987).
473. See VAGTS, supra note 458, at 161; Note, International
Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis of the United
States System and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 12 Brooklyn J.
Int'l L. 703 (1986). The arbitrators are agreed upon by the
parties, either directly or indirectly by referring to an
arbitral institution to act as an appointing authority.
474. See the references in supra note 473, especially Note,
at 703 in note 3.
475. 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974), citing the Zapata case (supra
note 439) on choice of forum clauses.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 515.
478. Id. at 516-17.
479. E.g. United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad
Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); for further
references see Note, Arbitration - Arbitrability of
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Antitrust Claims Arising From An International Commercial
Contract - Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
PlYmouth, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3346 (1985), 16 Ga. J. Int'l &
Comp . L . 355, 357 (1986).
480. Now at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
481. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [often called
The New York Convention].
482. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seg., esp. 202, 206.
483. See Note, supra note 473, at 714.
484. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
485. Note, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
PlYmouth, Inc.: International Arbitration and Antitrust
Claims, 7 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 595, 604 (1986).
486. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
487. See e.g. Note, supra note 485, at 616 ("The presence of
international business concerns in the arbitration do not
outweigh the importance of this fundamental domestic
policy."); Note, supra note 473, at 753-54 ;cf. also the
dissenting opinion of JJ. Stevens, Brennan and Marshall, 473
U.S. at 640 et seg., and the lower Court of Appeal's decis-
ion, 723 F.2d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1983). On the other hand
see Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The
Expanding Scope of International Arbitration, 12 Brooklyn J.
Int'l L. 629, 630 (1986)(" ...in transnational commercial
matters the business community's need for neutral dispute
resolution outweighs society's interest in supervising ad-
judication of public law claims.")
One might also be tempted to criticize that the Supreme
Court expanded the scope of arbitration on the expense of
the principle of non-review of the merits of an arbitral
award, as the unclear language that
"the national courts of the United States will have
the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to en-
sure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement
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of the antitrust laws has been addressed" (473 u.s. at
638)
might indicate. Probably the court wanted to remain within
the limits of the public policy reservation as to enforce-
ment, as the later language that
"[w]hile the efficacy of the arbitral process requires
that substantive review at the award-enforcement stage
remain minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry
to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the
antitrust claims and actually decided them" (id.)
suggests.
488. Cf. e.g. the Laker controversy, supra IV.A.3.
489. See Note, supra note 479, at 367: "Mitsubishi
represents the latest development of a trend in the federal
courts favoring arbitration. It is difficult to imagine a
decision which could be more unqualified in its support of
the enforcement of international arbitration agreements."
See also Feigenbaum, supra note 472, at 880-81.
490. Von Mehren, From vynior's Case to Mitsubishi: The Fu-
ture of Arbitration and Public Law, 12 Brooklyn J. Int'l L.
583, 592 (1986).
491. 1988 Georgia Arbitration Act.
492. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 208; Note, supra note 473, at 714;
Note, Commercial Arbitration in Georgia, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 323,
345 (1978).
493. See Note, supra note 492, at 346; 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 206.
494. Note, supra note 485, at 600.
495. See Pryles, supra note 436, esp at 570 ("It can be
seen, then, that as a general rule contractual exclusion of
domestic jurisdiction is considered effective in Germany and
France"); generally for a description of national arbitra-
tion systems in a variety of countries INTERNATIONAL HAND-
BOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (P. Sanders ed. 1984).
496. NANDA/PANSIUS, supra note 17, at 7-20. More detailed
Pryles, supra note 436, at 556-61.
138
497. See Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative
Assessment of Its Remedial and Substantive Status in
Transnational Commerce, 19 Tex. Int'l L.J. 33, 54 et seq.
(1984) with references; also J. ROBERT/TH. E. CARBONNEAU,
THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION (1983).
498. Von Mehren, supra note 490, at 595. Before the reform
agreements were accepted as a waiver of local jurisdiction,
but the legality of advance arbitration clauses was somewhat
unclear, cf. BATIFFOL/LAGARDE, supra note 234, at 427, and
Carbonneau, supra note 497, at 55-56.
499. Which generally recognizes arbitration agreements like
forum selection clauses, see Martiny, supra note 307, at
737.
500. See von Mehren, supra note 490, at 596; Carbonneau,
supra note 497, at 56.
501. Hertzberg/McGill, Conflict Resolution, 6 N.C.J. Int'l &
Com. Reg. 277, 304 (1980). See also von Mehren, supra note
490, at 593: "Arbitration has become a welcome method of
resolving disputes in almost all the legal systems of the
world."
502. See VAGTS, supra note 458, at 177; Note, supra note
473, at 708.
503. Note, supra note 473, at 705 with references.
504. A brief note on enforcement of the award, since without
an enforcement machinery it might be worthless: Enforcement
must be sought through national courts, depending on where
the assets are located, potentially outside the arbitral
forum country (as to this case it has been suggested that
suing at the respective state court is much speedier than
seeking to enforce a foreign arbitral award incl. the time
of the arbitral proceeding). The U.N. Convention requires
enforcement subject to enumerated exceptions (Art. V states
seven grounds for refusal); see e.g. Note, supra note 473,
at 707-10.
505. See Note, supra note 492, at 347-48.
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506. See Panacaviar, S.A. v. Iran, Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal Interim Award No. ITM 64-498-1 (Dec. 4, 1986), in
para. 13 speaking of "its inherent power to protect its own
jurisdiction in cases where the risk of inconsistent deci-
sions in parallel and duplicative proceedings instituted in
other fora [in the present case the courts of Basel} have
rendered this necessary," referring to E-Systems, Inc. v.
Iran, Interim Award No. 13-388-FT (Febr. 4, 1982). As to the
latter see Sohn, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal:
Jurisprudential Contributions to the Development of Interna-
tional Law, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-
1983 92, 102-03 (ed. R. Lillich 1983).
These kind of conflicts between arbitration and national
tribunals are not subject to any international law rules,
because arbitration tribunals do not (normally) act as or-
gans of states. This might be a problem in the case of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal established by treaty.
507. See supra V.B.6.
508. See supra at note 468.
509. See Pena Copper Mines Ltd. v. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd.,
(1911) 105 L.T. 846, [1911-1913] All E.R. 209 (C.A.) as to
English arbitration tribunals. For an extension to foreign
arbitration tribunals, because the rationale is the protec-
tion of the rights of a plaintiff with access to English
courts (not primarily the protection of English tribunals),
see Thomas, Restraining concurrent foreign legal proceed-
ings, 1983 Lloyd's Marit. & Corom. L.Q. 692, 693-94.
510. Supra IV.
511. See the chapter on antisuit injunctions supra IV.A.
512. Supra IV.B.6.
513. So the English Court of Appeal in Mantovani v. Carapel-
li, [1980] 1 Lloyd's 375, 382, where Lawton, L.J. stated:
"It seems to me obvious that, where a party to an arbi-
tration clause does obtain a sequestration order in a
foreign Court, that sequestration order may cause the
other party financial loss, perhaps in a substantial
amount. I can see no reason in principle why such loss
cannot be said to flow from the breach of the arbitra-
tion clause."
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514. Juenger, supra note 324, at 3.
515. See supra III.A.
516. WEINTRAUB, supra note 157, at 213 § 4.33.
517. See supra III.B.4.
518. See the U.S. law on stay because of pending action,
supra III.B.2.a.
519. See e.g. the German approach, supra III.B.2.d.
520. See supra III.C.
521. Or the civil law counterpart "substantive action for an
order to discontinue foreign proceedings." See supra IV.C.
522. See supra IV.A.4. and IV.E.
"523. See supra III.C.
524. For instance Italy, France, see supra III.C.2.
525. Cf. supra III.C.2.
526. So Italy, Germany, England, the European convention,
see supra III.C.3.a.
527. So Germany, the European convention, see supra
III.C.3.b.
528. So the United states, see supra III.C.3.b.
529. See supra at notes 336, 344.
530. See supra V.B.6 as to choice of forum clauses, and
supra V.C.3. as to arbitration clauses.
531. Note, supra note 367, at 1070.
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